University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2020

Defined Contribution Plans and the Challenge of Financial
Illiteracy
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Annamaria Lusardi
George Washington University

Andrea Hasler
George Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Adult and Continuing Education Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Commons, Education Policy Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Public Policy
Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons

Repository Citation
Fisch, Jill E.; Lusardi, Annamaria; and Hasler, Andrea, "Defined Contribution Plans and the Challenge of
Financial Illiteracy" (2020). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2076.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2076

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

10-AUG-20

12:10

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF FINANCIAL ILLITERACY
Jill E. Fisch† Annamaria Lusardi‡ & Andrea Hasler††

Retirement investing in the United States has changed
dramatically. The classic defined benefit (DB) plan has
largely been replaced by the defined contribution (DC) plan.
With the latter, individual employees’ decisions about how
much to save for retirement and how to invest those savings
determine the benefits available upon retirement.
We analyze data from the 2015 National Financial Capability Study to show that people whose only exposure to investment decisions is by virtue of their participation in an
employer-sponsored 401(k) plan are poorly equipped to make
sound investment decisions. Specifically, they suffer from
higher levels of financial illiteracy than other investors. This
lack of financial literacy is critical because of both the financial
consequences of poor financial decisions and a legal structure
that relies on participant choice to limit the fiduciary obligations of the employer with respect to the structure and options
provided by the retirement plan.
In response to this concern, we propose mandated employer-provided financial education to address limited employee financial literacy. We identify and discuss three
requirements that a financial education program should incorporate—a self-assessment, minimum substantive components, and timing. Formalizing the employer role in evaluating
and increasing financial literacy among plan participants is a
key step in providing retirement plan participants with the
resources necessary to manage important decisions regarding
retirement planning and, ultimately, for enhancing the financial security of American workers.
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INTRODUCTION
Retirement investing in the United States has changed dramatically. The classic pension plan, also known as a defined
benefit plan, in which an employer paid a retired employee a
fixed monthly benefit, is largely extinct.1 Instead, employers
have overwhelmingly switched to defined contribution plans,
commonly known as 401(k) plans, in which an individual employee’s decisions about how much to save for retirement and
how to invest that savings determine the benefits that the employee will have available upon retirement.2
The challenge with this system is that U.S. employees are
poorly equipped to make decisions about how to invest for retirement. Retirement investing is complicated, the typical
401(k) plan offers participants products that many of them do
not understand, and retirement saving is most effective when
people begin saving early. In addition to the initial decisions,
effective retirement investing requires plan participants to evaluate whether to make changes to their portfolios over the
1
See David E. Morse, Are Pension Plans Headed for Extinction?, 15 BENEFITS
L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (describing the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution
plans after the adoption of ERISA and the creation of the 401(k) plan).
2
The 401(k) plan is the product of changes made to the Internal Revenue
Code by the Revenue Act of 1978 that shield retirement savings from federal
income taxes. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763,
2785 (1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k) (2012)).
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course of their career and, when they retire, to determine how
to manage the balance in their accounts to provide income for
the rest of their lives.3
The complexity of appropriate retirement investing is compounded by the fact that financial literacy rates in the general
population are low.4 People with low financial literacy are susceptible to a variety of investment mistakes, including choosing
products that do not meet their needs and paying excessive
fees.5 In addition, studies have shown that people who score
lower in terms of financial literacy are less likely to plan for
retirement, leaving those who are most in need of retirement
planning most at risk.6
Although financial illiteracy is a widespread problem, the
evolution of workplace retirement investing exacerbates the
problem by imposing responsibility for financial well-being in
retirement on a group of people who are particularly ill-suited
for the task. We term these people “workplace-only investors,”
which we define as people whose only exposure to investment
decisions is by virtue of their participation in an employersponsored 401(k) plan or the equivalent. We view workplaceonly investors as forced or involuntary investors in that their
participation in the financial markets is a product of their employment and unlikely the result of informed choice.
This Article presents the first research that focuses specifically on the financial literacy of workplace-only investors. As
we document, data from the National Financial Capability
Study (NFCS) demonstrates that workplace-only investors suffer from higher levels of financial illiteracy than other investors.
These involuntary investors are particularly vulnerable to poor
financial choices, choices that they would likely avoid but for
the obligations imposed on them by the structure of their retirement plans. This lack of financial literacy is critical. Al3
See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance
of Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 24–26 (2014) (discussing how “[retirees] must forecast their (and their partner’s) survival probabilities, investment returns, pension income, and medical and other expenditures.”).
4
See id. at 6, 34 (defining financial literacy as “peoples’ ability to process
economic information and make informed decisions about financial planning,
wealth accumulation, debt, and pensions” and concluding that “low levels of
financial knowledge are pervasive.”).
5
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The Knowledge
Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional Advisors, 66
DUKE L.J. 633, 671 (2016) (finding that “financial literacy is a strong predictor of
investment outcomes”).
6
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement
Planning in the United States, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 509, 518 (2011).
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though the typical 401(k) plan requires workplace-only
investors to take primary responsibility in making investment
decisions for their own retirement, as we show, they lack the
knowledge necessary to do so appropriately.
This is not to criticize the shift from defined benefit plans to
defined contribution plans. As we detail below, defined benefit
plans suffered from a variety of problems, the most acute of
which were chronic underfunding7 and the fact that participants in defined benefit plans risked losing their benefits if they
changed employers.8 Defined benefit plans are a big impediment to labor mobility, because many workers change jobs
frequently. Defined contribution plans mitigate these
problems. They do so, however, by imposing primary responsibility on plan participants for making critical decisions about
retirement investing, without adequately addressing the limited ability of participants to do so.
The problem of financial illiteracy of plan participants is
compounded by the fact that the existing regulatory treatment
of defined contribution plans uses the construct of participant
choice as a basis for imposing limited responsibility on employers for the financial well-being of their employees in connection
with retirement investing.9 So long as an employer-sponsored
defined contribution plan delegates investment responsibility
to plan participants in accordance with Department of Labor
(DOL) regulations and meets certain minimal criteria, the employer is relieved of fiduciary responsibility for investment
losses suffered by its employees.10
Concededly, participant choice does not shield an employer from all potential liability. Employers have consistently
faced litigation challenges for failure to offer their employees an
appropriate retirement plan,11 and, even in the absence of litigation, many employers have sought to review and refine their
retirement plans.12 Critically, however, the law does not impose any obligation on employers to ensure that their employees have sufficient financial literacy to navigate the decisions
7

See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
9
See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants meaningful
choices . . . .”).
10
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that plan fiduciaries are not
responsible for losses which result from participants’ exercise of control).
11
See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans: Employers as
Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 504–05 (2014) (describing typical litigation).
12
See id. at 505–06.
8
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associated with retirement investing appropriately or to safeguard them from poor financial decisions resulting from financial illiteracy. Our findings suggest that such obligations are
long overdue.
Congress is continuing to try to make self-directed retirement savings more effective. For example, the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act (RESA) was originally introduced
into Congress in 2018 and was reintroduced in February 2019
before the Ways and Means Committee.13 The proposals in
RESA continue to rely on participant choice, however, which,
as we detail below, are of limited utility unless participants can
choose knowledgeably.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article briefly
traces the progression from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans and explains the manner in which this progression has changed the role of the plan participant. Part II
describes the legal standards applicable to an employer in connection with their 401(k) plan. In Part III, the Article reports
our findings that people who invest exclusively through an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan are less financially literate than
other investors and their personal finances are also quite different than other investors. Part IV considers the implications
of this finding for the viability of participant-directed retirement
savings. In Part V, we identify two potential responses. One
possibility is that ERISA could be modified to impose greater
responsibility on plan sponsors. We identify limitations in the
viability of this option, as well as the risk that it would decrease
employer willingness to provide retirement plans for their
workers. Alternatively, employer-sponsors of participant-directed 401(k) plans could be required to evaluate and remediate the financial literacy of plan participants, thereby
enhancing the effectiveness of participant choice. After discussing both, we suggest that the second alternative is the
more promising and offer preliminary reflections on how employers could do so effectively.

13
Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act of 2018, H.R. 5282, 115th
Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5282/
text#toc-H1077D5B691CE4439BF378EADF2E8581B [https://perma.cc/C7QSMRGJ].
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I
THE EVOLUTION OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
For decades, workers relied on employer-provided pension
plans for financial support in retirement.14 Employer-sponsored retirement savings plans began with the classic pension
plan, also known as a defined benefit plan, and the state and
local governments provided the first such plans to public sector
workers in the mid-1800s.15 In 1875, the American Express
Company created the first private sector pension plan in the
United States.16 Over the next fifty years, the popularity of
private pension plans increased, and by 1925 more than 400
plans existed in the United States, covering more than four
million workers.17 Following the Great Depression, private
pension plans continued to increase, fueled by tax incentives,
the strong demand for labor following World War II, and union
negotiations.18 Pension coverage increased to over 40% in the
1940s and ’50s, and pension assets increased from $2.4 billion
to $57 billion in twenty years.19
These early public and private sector pension plans were
defined benefit plans meaning that they paid a retired employee a fixed monthly amount after retirement. The employee’s benefit (the defined benefit) was typically calculated
based on the employee’s salary when he or she retired and the
length of service.20 In part, the structure of the pension plan
was designed to facilitate employee retention through a payout
structure that encouraged workers to stay with the same employer until retirement.21 This meant that, in many cases, defined benefit plans were not portable and, as a result, workers
often forfeited benefits when they changed jobs. Because job

14
See Liz Davidson, The History of Retirement Benefits, WORKFORCE (June 21,
2016), https://www.workforce.com/2016/06/21/the-history-of-retirement-bene
fits/ [https://perma.cc/S3CS-N3E4].
15
Id. See also ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF
PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (2003).
16
Davidson, supra note 14; JUSTIN OWENS & JOSHUA BARBASH, RUSSELL INVESTMENTS RESEARCH, DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS: A BRIEF HISTORY 2 (2014), https://russell
investments.com/-/media/files/us/insights/institutions/defined-benefit/de
fined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/62ES-GXHR].
17
OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16.
18
Id. at 3.
19
Id.
20
See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 922 (2013).
21
Id.
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mobility was increasing, lack of portability was a growing
problem.22
In a defined benefit plan, “[t]he employer is responsible for
funding the benefit, investing and managing plan assets, and
bearing the investment risk.”23 To fund defined benefit plans,
employers typically pay money into their plans every year. The
plan invests that money in a variety of assets such as stocks
and bonds.24 The expectation is that the plan’s assets would
grow and be sufficient to meet the plan’s obligations. This expectation was often not met, for a variety of reasons. Many
plans were underfunded.25 Others invested in overly risky assets—it was common for plans to be funded largely in the employer’s stock.26 Employers also faced increasing liability due
to their employees’ increasing longevity.27 And, as one commentator notes “embezzlement of plan assets was not uncommon.”28 Defined benefit plans were also criticized for the size of
the benefits that they paid out. In an era of economic growth,

22
See Alexandra Lopez-Pacheco, How We Got Here: The Gradual Rise of the
Defined Contribution Pension, FIN. POST (Dec. 6, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://business.
financialpost.com/executive/how-we-got-here-the-gradual-rise-of-the-definedcontribution-pension [https://perma.cc/2R7G-BWC5] (describing the lack of
portability of defined benefit plans).
23
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-176T, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGING FUNDING RULES AND ENHANCING INCENTIVES CAN IMPROVE PLAN FUNDING 1 n.1
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04176t.pdf. [https://perma.cc/93JEANQC].
24
See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, Lessons from Efforts to Manage the Shift of
Pensions to Defined Contribution Plans in the United States, Australia, and the
United Kingdom, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 315, 317 (2016) (“Normally, defined benefit
pension plans invest in a variety of assets, although a large percentage of them are
invested in financial products such as stocks, bonds, commodities, and
derivatives.”).
25
See Lopez-Pacheco, supra note 22 (explaining that many defined benefit
plans became underfunded as interest rates dropped); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 1 (describing pension underfunding as “a
crucial issue threatening the retirement security of millions of America’s workers
and retirees”).
26
The trend to fund employee retirement with the employer’s stock continued
after the shift to defined contribution plans. See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 20, at
928 (noting that “before the market downturn in 2001, in a number of large
firms—including Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and General Electric—more than
75% of 401(k) plan assets consisted of company stock.”). Gelter also notes that
“firms may have good reasons to encourage employees to invest their retirement
assets with them.” Id.
27
See Brown, supra note 24, at 317 (explaining that employers under a
defined benefit plan face the risk that employees may live longer than expected, so
that the pension plan funds may not be sufficient to cover the pension
obligations).
28
OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3.
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some commentators questioned whether workers were receiving as much as they should receive.29
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 to respond, in part, to the concerns
about employer-provided pension plans.30 ERISA focused on
improving the security of employees’ pension benefits. Perhaps
the most significant component of ERISA, at least in the short
term, was its minimum funding requirement for defined benefit
plans.31 ERISA also imposed fiduciary obligations on employer
and others involved in managing a pension plan.32 In addition,
ERISA imposed various rules on the structure of pension
plans, including vesting and participation requirements.33
The adoption of ERISA created the greatest regulatory burden for employers that provided a defined benefit plans because, under ERISA, the plan’s fiduciaries were “responsible
for investing the assets of the plan to ensure that there will be
enough money to meet future obligations to plan participants.”34 This meant that, if an employer underfunded its plan
or made poor investment decisions so that the plan did not
have enough assets to pay the required benefits, the employer
was responsible for the shortfall. One way for employers to
avoid their pension liability was by declaring bankruptcy, and
mounting pension obligations led a number of major employers
to do so.35
Employers can reduce their liability exposure by shifting to
defined contribution plans.36 In a defined contribution plan,
individual employees contribute a portion of their wages, deter29
See Lopez-Pacheco, supra note 22 (reporting concern during “days of high
interest rates” that defined benefit plans were causing employees to miss out on
high returns).
30
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 and in scattered
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.).
31
See Gelter, supra note 20, at 929 (“DB plans were subjected to minimum
funding rules, given that DB plans had previously often been woefully
underfunded.”).
32
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2018).
33
29 U.S.C. §§ 1052–53.
34
James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 507 (2013).
35
See id. at 520 (explaining that employer-sponsored pension plan’s bankruptcy would shift pension obligations to taxpayers); see, e.g., Jonathan Barry
Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 802 n.174
(2015) (noting that City of Detroit went bankrupt largely due to pension debts).
36
See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the
Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 167 (2013) (explaining that
“[r]egulatory burdens on defined benefit plans unintentionally created incentives
for employer sponsors to shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
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mined in advance, to the retirement plan.37 Each employee’s
individual contributions go to an individual account and are
invested, and the return on these contributions determines the
amount of money available to the employee upon retirement.
In some cases, the employer matches all or a portion of the
employee’s contribution.38 Because the contributions are segregated from the outset, unlike in a defined benefit plan, the
security of the employee’s retirement savings is not jeopardized
by the employer’s financial condition.
Although employers can, in theory, manage the investment
of their employees’ contributions in a defined contribution
plan, as a matter of practice, they do not do so.39 Instead,
employers offer their employees a menu of investment choices,
and individual plan participants designate how their money is
to be invested from among those choices. Because the employees, not the employer, decide both how much to invest and how
to invest their contributions, these plans are described as selfor participant-directed.40 Participant-directed plans substantially reduce the employer’s liability exposure because, so long
as the employer complies with the requirements of section
404(c) of ERISA, the statute provides a safe harbor or liability
shield from losses suffered by plan participants,41 even in situations in which the employer has arguably breached its duties.42 The three requirements for the safe harbor are (1) that
the plan offer participant control; (2) that the participant actually exercise control and (3) that the losses result from the
participant’s exercise of control.43
plans to avoid the additional costs and liabilities associated with pension funding
responsibilities”).
37
See Edward A. Zelinksy, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J.
451, 457 (2004) (explaining that defined contribution plans work like individual
accounts in which the employees’ benefits are determined by their contributions
and investment decisions).
38
See, e.g., Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan & Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral
Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1346
(2015) (exploring employer incentives with respect to matching employee plan
contributions).
39
See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, supra note 35, at 806 (explaining that, although
employers could, in theory, manage their employees’ investments in a defined
contribution plan, “we know of no defined contribution plans like that”).
40
See, e.g., Zelinksy, supra note 37, at 457 (calling defined contribution
assets “self-directed” because the employee has control over the investments).
41
ERISA § 404; 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012) (stipulating that neither the participant nor anyone else is a fiduciary for a retirement account over which the
participant exercises control).
42
DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005).
43
See Tucker, supra note 36, at 204 (describing the requirements of section
404(c)).
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The ERISA safe harbor does not provide employers with a
complete liability shield. Employers may be liable for providing
a plan that is structured inappropriately, such as one with an
insufficient range of investment options,44 unsuitable investment options, or that charges excessive fees. However, courts
have granted plan fiduciaries significant discretion with respect to their choices about plan structure and investment
options.45 Litigation asserting these claims is relatively common and will be discussed in more detail below. Despite this
litigation, an employer faces far more limited liability exposure
in connection with a defined contribution plan. In addition to
reduced liability exposure, defined contribution plans are less
costly for employers and are subject to less burdensome regulatory requirements.46
These factors have led most employers to shift from offering
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans and, in
some cases, to convert existing defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans.47 From 1983 to 1993, the number of defined contribution plans increased more than fivefold.48 Today
most private employers and even many public employers have
shifted to the defined contribution plan.49
44
See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(ii)(C) (2015) (requiring a minimum of
three investment options for retirement plans).
45
See Tucker, supra note 36, at 205–06.
46
See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution
Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 614–15 (2000) (describing defined benefit plans as
subject to “more onerous regulations” and greater costs and administrative
burdens).
47
Tucker, supra note 36, at 205 (observing that the “safe harbor and discretionary deference create incentives for employer sponsors to (1) provide or convert
existing pension benefits into a self-directed defined contribution model”).
48
Leora Friedberg & Michael T. Owyang, Not Your Father’s Pension Plan: The
Rise of 401(k) and Other Defined Contribution Plans, 84 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
REV. 22, 23 (Jan./Feb. 2002), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publica
tions/review/02/01/23-34Friedberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9H4-579G].
49
See, e.g., NEWPORT GROUP, COMPENSATION, RETIREMENT, AND BENEFITS TRENDS
REPORT 12 (2017/2018 ed.), https://www.newportgroup.com/newportgroup/me
dia/documents/c202b-112717-2017-2018-edition-compensation-retirementand-benefits-trends-executive-summary-(002)_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7H3VSU6] (reporting results of 2017–2018 in which 91% of private employers reported offering a defined contribution plan while only 11% reported offering a
defined benefit plan, either alone or in combination with a defined contribution
plan); Jerry Geisel, Fortune 500 Continues to Shed Pension Plans, BUS. INS. (Feb.
22, 2016), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160222/NEWS03/
160229986 [https://perma.cc/G6DZ-YYFV] (documenting decline in percentage
of Fortune 500 companies offering defined benefit plans from 58% in 1998 to less
than 20% in 2015). Although a majority of public sector employees still participate in defined benefit plans, most of those plans are not open to new employees.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THREE QUARTERS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
WORKERS WERE IN DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS IN 2016 (May 3, 2017), https://

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 11

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN

10-AUG-20

12:10

751

Significantly, the shift to defined contribution plans reduced the number of employees who participated in employerbased retirement plans because it allowed individual employees to choose not to participate.50 In response to this concern
as well as literature suggesting that enrollments would be
higher under a system in which employees were automatically
enrolled in their employer’s plan and then had to take action to
opt out, if they chose,51 Congress adopted the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006.52 The PPA made automatic enrollment
in defined contribution plans easier and clarified the employer’s obligations with respect to auto-enrollment.53 In particular, the PPA authorized employers that adopted autoenrollment to invest employees’ contributions in a qualified
default investment alternative, which was defined by the statute as either (1) “diversified so as to minimize the risk of large
losses” and “designed to provide . . . a mix of equity and fixed
income exposures based on the participant’s age, target retirement date (such as normal retirement age under the plan) or
life expectancy,” or (2) “consistent with a target level of risk
appropriate for participants of the plan as a whole.”54 Traditional target date funds and balanced funds are commonly
used as default options.55
The response to the PPA was significant—as of 2012, approximately 40% of Fortune 100 companies in the United
States had implemented auto-enrollment, and participation
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/three-quarters-of-state-and-local-governmentworkers-were-in-defined-benefit-pension-plans-in-2016.htm [https://perma.cc/
EX8H-556B].
50
See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic
Workplace Retirement Plans, 91 IND. L.J. 505, 516 (2016) (describing a “massive
retirement crisis” caused by defined contribution plans and identifying failure of
workers to participate in such plans as one contributing factor).
51
See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary
Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2013) (explaining that whether the plan default is participation or non-participation “dramatically affects participation rates”).
52
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 821–33, 901–06,
120 Stat. 780, 782–83 (2006); see Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 51 (2015) (“The PPA’s strategy was inspired by academic
studies that showed huge increases in enrollment when companies switched to
auto-enrolling employees, who could then choose to opt out, in 401(k) plans.”
(footnote omitted)).
53
Auto-enrollment had previously been permissible, and IRS revenue rulings
in 1998 and 2000 facilitated its use. See Brown, supra note 24, at 330.
54
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2009).
55
Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1516
(2015).
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rates rose at employers that shifted to auto-enrollment.56 According to a 2018 Willis Towers Watson survey, the percentage
of employers using auto-enrollment has grown to 73%.57 One
study found that participation rates among new hires more
than doubled under automatic enrollment versus voluntary
enrollment.58
The overall effectiveness of auto-enrollment may have been
overstated. While automatic enrollment has clearly increased
enrollment into retirement accounts, it is much less clear if it
has increased net savings or employee’s wellbeing. Recent census data suggests that employee participation rates may be
much lower than previously thought, particularly at smaller
employers.59 Research has identified the fact that the employer-selected default rate is “sticky,” meaning that most employees do not deviate from the savings rate set by their
employer, which has been normally quite low.60 This can lead
to low overall savings levels.61 These rates are particularly
problematic to the extent that plan participants view the employer-selected rate as a benchmark and assume that saving at
that rate will be sufficient to meet their retirement needs.62
56
Susan Farris et al., Defined Contribution Plans of Fortune 100 Companies
for the 2012 Plan Year, TOWERS WATSON: INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2014), https://
www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2014/
defined-contribution-plans-of-fortune-100-companies-in-2012 [https://
perma.cc/Y5NF-H2JZ].
57
Paula Aven Gladych, Employers Adding 401(k) Auto-Enrollment in Record
Numbers, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.benefitnews.com/
news/employers-adding-401-k-auto-enrollment-in-record-numbers?regconf=1
[https://perma.cc/U2UQ-K9U8].
58
Jeffrey W. Clark, Stephen P. Utkus & Jean A. Young, Automatic Enrollment:
The Power of the Default, VANGUARD 1, 4 (2015), https://pressroom.vanguard.
com/nonindexed/Automatic_enrollment_power_of_default_1.15.2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V975-9N3L].
59
See, e.g., Dan Kadlec, A Popular Cure for the Retirement Crisis Isn’t Making
Much Headway, MONEY (Mar. 9, 2017), http://time.com/money/4693386/401kauto-enrollment-retirement-saving/ [https://perma.cc/9BFP-D4JX] (reporting
that “[s]ome 79% of Americans are eligible to contribute to a 401(k) but only 41%
of eligible workers do so”).
60
Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1618 (2014).
61
See Kelley Holland, The Downside of Automatic 401(k) Enrollment, CNBC
(June 29, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/29/the-downside-of-automatic-401k-enrollment.html [https://perma.cc/UM2E-PWJB] (reporting that automatic enrollment increased employee participation but reduced contribution
levels).
62
See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 81–82 (2002) (explaining that more than half of
employees automatically enrolled may never adjust the default contribution rate).
Participants may also take cues from the structure of their employer’s match
formula in determining what an appropriate savings level is. See also Stephen
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Another problem is that, if employer-selected rates are too
high and/or employees’ precautionary savings are minimal,
employees may offset the savings by increasing their levels of
debt. One recent paper studied the shift by the U.S. Army to
automatic enrollment in its Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and found
evidence of this effect. The research showed that “a significant
portion of the increase in TSP contributions induced by automatic enrollment is offset by increased debt outside the TSP.”63
This effect is not surprising given the evidence about household debt, the prevalence of debt in many household balance
sheets, and the paucity of precautionary savings.64 The recent
government shutdown provided acute evidence about the lack
of emergency savings among those with government jobs,
which normally carry good pension benefits.65
More generally, one size does not fit all. Both the employer’s selection of a savings rate and a choice of investment
for the employees’ savings raise potential problems because
employees vary in their age, outside savings, income, debt obligations, and funding needs when they retire. There is no way
that an employer can designate a default rate or investment
option that is right for everyone. But employees typically lack
any basis by which to evaluate whether the employer’s default
choices are appropriate for them and stick to what is chosen for
them.
The most recent adaption to the problem of savings rates
that are too low is auto-escalation. Recognizing that the initial
Miller, Auto Escalation Beats Inertia, So Why the Hesitancy?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES.
MGMT. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/bene
fits/pages/auto-escalation-hesitancy.aspx [https://perma.cc/UP32-WVYJ]. The
concern may be exacerbated by the extent to which employers focus on participation rates rather than evaluating whether their employees are saving enough for
retirement. See, e.g., Gladych, supra note 57 (reporting that while 88% of plans
sponsors measure participation rates, only 35% measure the retirement readiness of their participants).
63
John Beshears et al., Borrowing to Save? Unintended Consequences of
Automatic Enrollment 1, 11 (Feb. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/total_savings_impact_2017_12_06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89ZT-NUSC].
64
See Emmie Martin, The Government Shutdown Highlights How Few Americans Have Enough Money Saved for Emergencies, CNBC MAKE IT (Jan. 16, 2019,
8:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/government-shutdown-highlights-how-few-americans-have-emergency-savings.html [https://perma.cc/
X53K-8B5G] (discussing the widespread lack of emergency savings in American
households); infra Table 4a (detailing the prevalence of debt in American
households).
65
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 64 (reporting that the 2019 government shutdown forced some federal workers to “rely on credit cards” or donations due to a
temporary loss of income).
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default savings rates common to auto-enrollment may be too
low, some employers are adopting plans in which the participants’ default contribution increases automatically.66 A number of commentators have cited the benefits of auto-escalation,
but employers have been somewhat hesitant to adopt this feature.67 Yet again, this feature fails to take into account that
workers may have different needs and that they change employers often.
Use of auto-enrollment and other features to increase employee retirement savings beyond the initial enrollment decision has become more popular as prominent employers have
taken the lead.68 For example, in 2017, American Express announced that it had adopted an auto-enrollment plan with
auto-escalation for all new employees. American Express also
communicates at least once annually with all its employees
who are not enrolled in the plan or who invest less than the full
amount that is matched by the company.69 As we discuss in
more detail below, automatic enrollment and automatic escalation may work well in an environment in which employees stay
with a single firm for a long time, but this feature is not common anymore in the workplace and was a factor contributing to
the shift toward defined contribution pension plans.
II
FIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR 401(K) PLANS
ERISA is premised on a fiduciary framework. Employers
and plan administrators are subject to various fiduciary obligations, including a duty to select and monitor the plan’s investment options70 and a duty to refrain from conflicts of interest
and self-dealing in connection with the administration of the
plan.71 As noted above, so long as participants exercise mean66
See Marlene Y. Satter, Auto-Enroll, Escalation Features on Rise in 401(k)s
as Employers Add Enhancements, BENEFITSPRO (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:39 AM),
https://www.benefitspro.com/2018/02/27/auto-enroll-escalation-features-onrise-in-401ks-a/ [https://perma.cc/KAB8-8PCC].
67
See e.g., Miller, supra note 62 (arguing that auto-escalation has substantial benefits despite employer hesitancy).
68
See Robert Steyer, American Express Starts Auto Enrollment in 401(k) for
New Employees, PENSIONS & INV. (July 13, 2017, 1:00 AM), http://www.pionline.
com/article/20170713/ONLINE/170719886/american-express-starts-auto-enrollment-in-401k-for-new-employees [https://perma.cc/9YLM-Q8M3] (reporting
that American Express adopted auto-enrollment and auto-escalation features);
Satter, supra note 66 (reporting that 60% of employee retirement plans now offer
an auto-escalation feature).
69
Steyer, supra note 68.
70
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1829 (2015).
71
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2018).
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ingful control over their investments, the ERISA safe harbor
protects plan fiduciaries from losses suffered by the
participants.72
Despite this safe harbor, plan participants have brought a
number of litigation challenges in connection with employersponsored 401(k) plans.73 These cases alleged that employers
and plan administrators breached their fiduciary duties by providing menus of investment options that offered an insufficient
number of choices of investment options, inferior investment
options, or investment options that charged high fees. Courts
evaluating these challenges have given considerable weight to
the role of participant choice, adopting the view that, as a general matter, imperfections in some of the investment options
can be mitigated so long as the plan contains some high-quality options and participants have sufficient choice.
In the leading case, Hecker v. Deere & Co.,74 the Seventh
Circuit held that a fiduciary satisfies its obligations under ERISA by offering plan participants a suitable number of investment options with fees that were subject to market
competition. Deere’s plan provided employees with “a generous
choice of investment options” that included “23 different Fidelity mutual funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity
Trust, a fund devoted to Deere’s stock, and a Fidelity-operated
facility called Brokerage Link, which gave participants access
to some 2,500 additional funds managed by different companies.”75 Quoting the district court with approval, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the fees among the primary funds ranged
from “just over 1% to as low as .07%”76 and were offered to the
general public, so the fees “were set against the backdrop of
market competition.”77 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the plan participants had the ability to protect themselves
through their choice among these options, qualifying the plan
for the protection of the statutory safe harbor.78
72

29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1).
See generally Mercer Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20
CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 340–50 (2014) (describing several types of litigation challenges to employer-sponsored 401(k) plans).
74
556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
75
Id. at 578.
76
Id. at 581.
77
Id. at 586; see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D.
Wis. 2007) (concluding that it was “untenable to suggest that all of the more than
2500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense ratios”).
78
See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 589. Notably, the Eighth Circuit reached a different result but employed similar reasoning in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588
73
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Similarly, in Renfro v. Unisys, the Third Circuit, in evaluating allegations of excessive fees, highlighted the fact that “[a]n
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement
savings.”79 The court found that the Unisys plan, which contained “seventy-three distinct investment options [including]
funds with a variety of risk and fee profiles, including low-risk
and low-fee options” offered a reasonable range of investment
options and that, as a result, plaintiffs had not “plausibly alleged a breach of fiduciary duty.”80
Perhaps the most important in these series of cases is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Tibble v. Edison International,81 in
which the Court held that ERISA fiduciaries have a continuing
duty to monitor the quality of the investments offered in their
401(k) plans. The Court specifically noted that this duty includes an obligation to remove imprudent investment options
from the plan. The Court did not consider, however, what constituted an imprudent investment option or the extent to which
a fiduciary could be liable if the plan offered sufficient
alternatives.
Recently a series of high-profile lawsuits targeted twelve
major universities with similar allegations, challenging the
structure of their 403(b) plans (the nonprofit equivalent of
401(k) plans) including the choice of investment options, imprudent monitoring, and excessive fees.82 The lawsuits responded, in part, to the Tibble decision by alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty due to the plan sponsors’ failure to remove underperforming funds from the plan. In addition, and, in contrast to some of the earlier challenges, most of these lawsuits
also alleged that the plans were improperly structured because
F.3d 585, 596 (8th Cir. 2009). The Braden court refused to dismiss a lawsuit
claiming that Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan included funds with unreasonably high fees,
reasoning in part that the Wal-Mart plan offered a limited number of options,
consisting of “ten mutual funds, a common/collective trust, Wal-Mart common
stock, and a stable value fund.” Id. at 589. Comparing the plan to the one at
issue in Deere, the court observed that the “far narrower range of investment
options available in this case makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was
imprudently managed.” Id. at 596 n.6.
79
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011).
80
Id. at 327–28.
81
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015).
82
See Clarissa A. Kang, New Wave of Retirement Fee Litigation: The University
403(b) Lawsuits, TRUCKER HUSS (Jan. 2017), http://www.truckerhuss.com/2017/
02/new-wave-of-retirement-fee-litigation-the-university-403b-lawsuits/ [https:/
/perma.cc/E3QV-XPJN]; see also Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 209100, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing several such cases).
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they offered plan participants too many investment options.83
The complaints alleged that too many options “confus[ed]” participants and prevented them from making educated choices.84
Many of the cases are still pending, and courts have shown
varied degrees of sympathy to the plaintiffs’ claims.85 For the
most part, however, the courts have continued to focus on the
primacy of participant choice and to dismiss claims that asked
the court to second-guess the sponsor’s choice of investment
options. As the court explained in Henderson v. Emory University, for example, “[h]aving too many options does not hurt the
Plans’ participants, but instead provides them opportunities to
choose the investments that they prefer.”86
Similarly, the court’s decision dismissing the lawsuit
against the University of Pennsylvania highlighted the primacy
of participant choice over an evaluation of each individual investment option. The court reasoned that the liability standard
under ERISA required the plaintiffs to show “systemic mismanagement such that individuals are presented with a Hobson’s
choice between a poorly-performing § 401(k) portfolio or no
§401(k) at all.”87 The court described viable potential claims for
a plan participant under ERISA as follows:
A plaintiff can allege an inadequate “mix and range of options” by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast majority of) options breach the fiduciary duty, an insufficient
variety among the range of options, or a kickback scheme
where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of plan
participants.88

III
THE DISTINCTIVE FINANCIAL ILLITERACY OF WORKPLACEONLY INVESTORS
A critical policy consideration in evaluating employer responsibility with respect to the structure of 401(k) plans is the
83
See, e.g., Henderson v. Emory Univ., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
2017) (citing plaintiff’s allegation that “having too many investment options is
imprudent”).
84
See, e.g., Sacerdote v. N.Y.U., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137115, at *35
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (noting plaintiffs’ claim that the failure to limit the
number of investment options is “confusing” for participants).
85
See, e.g., Nicolas, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209100, at *7 (observing that in
many of the cases, the courts have allowed claims to proceed beyond the motion
to dismiss stage).
86
Henderson, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 1350.
87
Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
21, 2017).
88
Id. at *14.
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ability of plan participants to fend for themselves effectively.
Whether employees are able to do so depends, in part, on the
financial literacy of this distinctive category of investors—investors that are de facto forced to engage with the financial
markets in order to participate in their employer-sponsored
retirement plan. To date, however, the literature has not focused on workplace-only investors.
To document the financial knowledge and other characteristics of these investors, we analyze data from the 2015 wave of
the NFCS.89 This is one of the few surveys that provide detailed
information not only on measures of personal finance and indicators of money management behavior but also on the financial literacy of a large and representative sample of the U.S.
population. For the purpose of our analysis, we restrict the
sample to those aged 25 to 60 and who are not retired, to focus
on individuals who are not in school and must save and invest
for retirement.90
Our overall sample consists of 14,640 survey respondents.
Of these, approximately 60% are, in the terminology of this
Article, investors, meaning that they invest through an employer-provided retirement account, through a self-directed retirement account, or through nonretirement account
investments. Through the questions included in the survey
(detailed in the data appendix below), we divide the investors
into two groups. The first, whom we term workplace-only investors, are those who have retirement accounts through their
employers in which they get to choose how the money is invested but who do not have any other type of retirement account that they have set up themselves91 or any other financial
investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds or other securities. Workplace-only investors are not a small group of the
population of investors; in fact, they account for 28% of the
population of investors considered in our analysis. Thus, they
are an important group to study.
The second group of investors, whom we term active investors, are those who have made decisions about their invest-

89
The NFCS is a project of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation (FINRA
Foundation). National Financial Capability Study, FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND.
(2015), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/results.php?region=us [https://
perma.cc/2QXM-NGMQ].
90
See the data appendix for a detailed description of the survey and the
sample used in this empirical analysis.
91
Other such retirement accounts might include an IRA, Keogh, or SEP IRA.
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ments outside of an employer-provided retirement account.92
Specifically, the active investors have private retirement accounts they have set up themselves and/or financial investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other securities. We
aggregate active investors into one group for purposes of comparing them to workplace-only investors, but we also consider
them separately because they may display different motives to
save and invest. Within the group of active investors, roughly
50% have both a self-directed retirement account that they set
up themselves and other financial investments.
An advantage of using data from the NFCS is that it reports
information on levels of financial literacy, and the information
is richer than in many other data sets.93 Specifically, the NFCS
has data on the Big Three financial literacy questions, which
measure knowledge of basic financial literacy concepts—
numeracy, inflation, and risk diversification.94 The NFCS also
reports information on questions that measure knowledge of
investing, such as the negative relationship between interest
rates and bond prices.95 In 2015, a new financial literacy question was added to the NFCS questionnaire measuring the
knowledge of the workings of interest compounding in the context of debt.96
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics about different investment groups by levels of financial literacy and demographics
characteristics.97
92
The data appendix provides more information about the composition of the
investor groups used for this analysis. Active investors can also have a defined
contribution account with their employers, which is true for 68% of active investors in our sample.
93
2015 National Financial Capability Study State-by-State Instrument (Questionnaire), FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND. (2015) https://www.usfinancialcapability.
org/downloads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Qre.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y58J2C4]. The raw survey data is freely downloadable from Data File Information:
2015 State-by-State Survey, NAT’L FIN. CAPABILITY STUDY (June 19, 2016), https://
www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Data_
Excel.zip [https://perma.cc/8NF9-EAZ2].
94
One of us pioneered the development and widespread use of the Big Three
financial literacy questions which have been used to measure financial literacy
around the world. See GLOB. FIN. LITERACY EXCELLENCE CTR., THREE QUESTIONS TO
MEASURE FINANCIAL LITERACY, http://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/3Questions-Article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUF2-7GBJ] (describing the Big
Three). For an overview of findings related to the use of the Big Three, see Lusardi
& Mitchell, supra note 6, at 497.
95
FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2016,
at 28 (2016), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Re
port_Natl_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTN5-2CG2].
96
Id. at 29.
97
See the data appendix for a description of the variables used in the empirical work. Note that the survey identifies participant characteristics at a specific
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Table 1 shows that workplace-only investors are very different from other investors. Their level of financial literacy is
strikingly low and much lower than the financial literacy of
active investors. This difference in financial literacy is reflected
both by the responses to the Big Three financial literacy questions, which measure basic financial knowledge, and the questions that deal with more sophisticated concepts, such as the
concept of compound interest. Specifically, only slightly more
than one third (37%) of workplace-only investors have some
basic financial knowledge as measured by the Big Three, and
only 35% can answer the question about compound interest
correctly.

point in time. Over the course of their lifetimes, investors may, for example,
become active investors.
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables
(weighted
mean)

Financial
literacy
Big Three
correct
Risk
diversification
Asset/Bond
pricing
Interest comp.
Mortgage
Inflation

(1)
Active
investor in
financial
markets or
ret.
savings

(2)
Active in
retirement
savings

(3)
Active
investors
in
financial
markets

(4)
Workplaceonly
investors

(5)
(6)
General
Investor
population population

0.4728

0.4853

0.4879

0.3658

0.4423

0.3280

0.6183

0.6284

0.6359

0.4997

0.5845

0.4669

0.3873

0.4040

0.4131

0.2612

0.3514

0.2748

0.4401
0.8550
0.6780

0.4462
0.8663
0.6791

0.4484
0.8582
0.6710

0.3510
0.8678
0.6339

0.4147
0.8586
0.6654

0.3416
0.7674
0.5825

0.5807
0.4193

0.5685
0.4315

0.6134
0.3866

0.5017
0.4983

0.5582
0.4418

0.5072
0.4928

0.6559
0.0952
0.1555
0.0755
0.0179

0.6600
0.0891
0.1523
0.0815
0.0171

0.6514
0.0910
0.1577
0.0822
0.0178

0.6647
0.1135
0.1516
0.0464
0.0239

0.6584
0.1004
0.1543
0.0672
0.0196

0.6341
0.1216
0.1661
0.0552
0.0230

0.2660
0.3886
0.3454

0.2435
0.3924
0.3641

0.2787
0.3938
0.3275

0.2821
0.4401
0.2778

0.2706
0.4032
0.3262

0.2915
0.3973
0.3111

0.0670

0.0604

0.0580

0.0573

0.0642

0.2185

0.1670

0.1569

0.1473

0.2586

0.1931

0.2447

0.4193

0.4159

0.4170

0.4657

0.4326

0.3415

0.3467

0.3667

0.3778

0.2184

0.3102

0.1953

0.1526

0.1467

0.1425

0.2143

0.1701

0.2628

0.3739
0.4735

0.3596
0.4937

0.3643
0.4933

0.4816
0.3041

0.4046
0.4252

0.4265
0.3107

0.6643
0.2393

0.6797
0.2263

0.6733
0.2393

0.6575
0.2209

0.6624
0.2340

0.5515
0.3109

0.0822

0.0809

0.0729

0.1133

0.0910

0.1213

0.0143

0.0130

0.0145

0.0084

0.0126

0.0163

Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age
25–34 years
35–49 years
50–60 years
Income
Below
$25,000
$25,000–
$49,000
$50,000–
$99,000
Over
$100,000
Education
High school or
less
Some college
College
graduate or
above
Marital status
Married
Single, not
married
Divorced or
separated
Widowed
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0.7615

0.7646

0.7692

0.8119

0.7759

0.6379

0.1041
0.0325
0.1019

0.1040
0.0323
0.0991

0.1101
0.0276
0.0931

0.0350
0.0278
0.1253

0.0844
0.0312
0.1086

0.0863
0.0787
0.1971

6,322

4,892

4,574

2,459

8,781

14,640

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. The averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in column 1
versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap of about 50% between the two
investor groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is
higher compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The
Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the
respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions
correctly. The income brackets report household annual income from all sources,
such as wages, tips, investment income, public assistance, and retirement plans.

When we further compare across different investor groups,
we find that the financial literacy of workplace-only investors
differs from the knowledge of those who made active choices in
their retirement savings. Even though both types of investors
may have similar motives to save and both utilize tax-favored
investments, those who set up retirement accounts by themselves display much higher financial literacy than those we
define as workplace-only investors. The financial literacy of
workplace-only investors is also lower than the financial literacy of those who invested outside of retirement accounts. In
other words, those who are likely to have made little or no
choice about their retirement account know little about basic
financial concepts. These are of course simple correlations,
but they highlight the differences in financial knowledge across
investors and, in particular, the low levels of financial literacy
of workplace-only investors.
The financial literacy of workplace-only investors is particularly low and alarming when looking at concepts specifically
connected with investment decisions, such as bond pricing
(measuring whether respondents know the inverse relationship
between asset pricing and interest rates) and risk diversification (measuring whether respondents know whether a company stock is riskier or safer than a stock mutual fund and
what stocks and stock mutual funds are). Only half of workplace-only investors have some rudimentary knowledge of risk
diversification and only 26% know about basic asset pricing.
In this respect, the financial knowledge of workplace-only investors more closely resembles that of the general population
than the population of investors.
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Table 1 also contains demographic information on our
sample population. Looking at the demographic characteristics of the different investor groups, we see that workplace-only
investors are more likely to include vulnerable subgroups of
the population. For example, workplace-only investors are
much more likely than other investors to be people with lower
income and less education, those with split families (divorced/
separated), and women. As expected, workplace-only investors
are less likely to be self-employed, but self-employment is not
the main driver for having a non-employer-based retirement
account.
A high proportion of those who have employer-sponsored
401(k) accounts are young workers. One may argue that retirement accounts will introduce workers to investment and finance and that their financial literacy will improve over time. At
least within our sample, this does not seem to be the case.
When we split the sample into two age groups, those younger
and those older than age 40, we find that the knowledge gap
between workplace-only investors and other investors does not
decrease across age groups. Table 2 reports demographic information for the split sample. Table 2a shows the information
for investors under 40, and Table 2b reports the results for
investors over 40. Looking at those older than 40, we continue
to see a large difference in financial knowledge between workplace-only investors and active investors. Yet again, workplaceonly investors more closely resemble the general older population than the population of older investors. In other words, our
older workplace-only investors do not seem to have acquired a
lot of financial knowledge.98

98
It is worth noting that in a single cross-section, we cannot separate age
from cohort effects. Moreover, our analysis is at a single point in time—2015—
and respondents in our survey may have switched groups prior to the time at
which they respond. Because the NFCS is not a panel data set, we cannot follow
the same individual over time.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt

764

unknown

Seq: 24

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

10-AUG-20

12:10

[Vol. 105:741

TABLE 2A: Financial Literacy Measures for Individuals
Younger than 40 Years
Variables
(weighted
mean)
Financial
literacy
Big Three
correct
Risk
diversification
Asset/Bond
pricing
Interest
comp.
Mortgage
Inflation
Observations

(1)
Active
investor in
financial
markets or
ret. savings

(2)
Active in
retirement
savings

(3)
Active
investors
in
financial
market

(4)
Workplaceonly
investors

(5)
(6)
Investor
General
population population

0.3737

0.3710

0.3797

0.2998

0.3520

0.2586

0.5447

0.5384

0.5496

0.4404

0.5141

0.4148

0.3297

0.3353

0.3416

0.2340

0.3017

0.2313

0.4536

0.4639

0.4563

0.3804

0.4321

0.3582

0.8133
0.5354

0.8234
0.5208

0.8202
0.5222

0.8442
0.5307

0.8224
0.5340

0.7352
0.4653

2,718

1,988

2,014

1,152

3,870

6,704

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–40; all estimates are
weighted. Some of the averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in
column 1 versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap between the two
investor groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is
higher compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The
Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the
respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions
correctly.
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TABLE 2B: Financial Literacy Measures for Individuals Older
than 40 Years
Variables
(weighted
mean)
Financial
literacy
Big Three
correct
Risk
diversification
Asset/Bond
pricing
Interest
comp.
Mortgage
Inflation
Observations

(1)
Active
investor in
financial
markets or
ret. savings

(2)
Active in
retirement
savings

(3)
Active
investors
in
financial
market

(4)
Workplaceonly
investors

(5)
(6)
Investor
General
population population

0.5497

0.5651

0.5779

0.4209

0.5139

0.3865

0.6754

0.6912

0.7077

0.5492

0.6403

0.5109

0.4320

0.4520

0.4726

0.2839

0.3909

0.3114

0.4295

0.4339

0.4418

0.3264

0.4009

0.3276

0.8874
0.7886

0.8963
0.7897

0.8898
0.7946

0.8876
0.7203

0.8874
0.7696

0.7945
0.6813

3,604

2,904

2,560

1,307

4,911

7,936

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 41–60; all estimates are
weighted. The averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in column 1
versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap between the two investor
groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is higher
compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The Big
Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions correctly.

Table 3 reports the results of regression analyses in which
we analyze different investor types taking into consideration
their different demographic characteristics and levels of financial literacy.99 Several findings stand out. First, financial literacy continues to be associated with a higher likelihood of being
an active investor, even after controlling for many demographic
characteristics, including age and education. Financial sophistication in particular—for example knowing about asset pricing—is associated with being an active investor and not a
workplace-only investor (note that the estimates of this financial literacy measure change sign across investor types; i.e.,
those who know about basic asset pricing are less likely to be a
workplace-only investor and more likely to have both retirement accounts they set up themselves and other financial
investments).

99
We are aware that the classification of investors is not exogenous but the
result of choice and, moreover, that some variables, such as financial literacy, can
be considered endogenous. However, this is simply a descriptive analysis and
does not purport to address causation.
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TABLE 3: Regression Results Across Investor Groups
Variables
(weighted mean)

(1)
Active investor in
financial markets
or ret. savings

(2)
Active in
retirement
savings

0.091***
(0.008)
0.088***
(0.008)
0.067***
(0.008)

0.068***
(0.008)
0.084***
(0.008)
0.055***
(0.008)

0.071***
(0.007)
0.093***
(0.008)
0.046***
(0.007)

0.012*
(0.007)
-0.029***
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)

-0.045***
(0.007)

-0.016**
(0.007)

-0.063***
(0.007)

0.009
(0.006)

0.001
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.063***
(0.016)
-0.036
(0.024)

-0.011
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.010)
0.077***
(0.015)
-0.036
(0.023)

0.002
(0.011)
0.001
(0.009)
0.075***
(0.015)
-0.018
(0.023)

0.009
(0.010)
-0.022***
(0.008)
-0.038***
(0.013)
0.015
(0.020)

-0.023**
(0.009)
0.057***
(0.009)

0.006
(0.009)
0.084***
(0.009)

-0.032***
(0.008)
0.006
(0.009)

0.008
(0.007)
-0.020**
(0.008)

0.107***
(0.011)
0.271***
(0.011)
0.414***
(0.013)
school or less)
0.049***
(0.009)
0.181***
(0.010)

0.075***
(0.011)
0.203***
(0.011)
0.336***
(0.013)

0.062***
(0.010)
0.201***
(0.011)
0.350***
(0.013)

0.120***
(0.009)
0.170***
(0.009)
0.137***
(0.011)

0.032***
(0.009)
0.157***
(0.010)

0.032***
(0.009)
0.135***
(0.010)

0.031***
(0.008)
-0.019**
(0.009)

0.028***
(0.008)

0.031***
(0.008)

0.019**
(0.008)

0.021***
(0.007)

-0.067***
(0.014)
0.043***
(0.013)

-0.040***
(0.013)
-0.015
(0.012)

-0.060***
(0.013)
0.051***
(0.012)

-0.048***
(0.012)
0.039***
(0.011)

14,640
0.246

14,640
0.195

14,640
0.199

14,640
0.042

Risk diversification
Asset/Bond pricing
Interest comp.

(3)
(4)
Active investors
Workplaceonly investors
in financial
market

Gender
Female
Ethnicity (BL: White)
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Age (BL: 25-34)
35–49 years
50–60 years
Income (BL: <$25,000)
$25,000–$49,000
$50,000–$99,000
Over $100,000
Education (BL: High
Some college
College graduate or
above
Marital status
Married
Employment
Unemployed
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. Married is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is
married, but not divorced, separated or widowed, and 0 otherwise. Income brackets report household annual income from all sources, such as wages, tips, investment income, public assistance, and retirement plans. The abbreviation BL
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stands for baseline, which is the reference group. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In addition, several demographic variables play an important role. We find, unsurprisingly, an education divide when it
comes to investing. Those with college or higher degrees are
much more likely to be active investors, both in retirement
savings and other financial investments, and are less likely to
be workplace-only investors. Importantly, however, both general education and specialized financial knowledge matter for
investment behavior; there is an independent effect of financial
literacy even after controlling for education. Second, women
are much less likely to be active investors both in retirement
and other financial investments.100 Third, individuals with
higher income are more likely to be investors, both workplaceonly and active ones, but the effect estimate is particularly
large for being active investors for those with income greater
than $100,000.
Finally, the effect of age appears to vary. Older investors
who are below 50 are less likely to be active investors, while in
the 50 to 60 age range, they are less likely to be workplace-only
investors and instead are more likely to have other retirement
accounts. We suspect that this age effect is the product of the
evolution of employer-based retirement savings plans described above—some participants over 50 may already have
changed jobs (even several times) and, upon leaving their employer, rolled their former 401(k) savings over into an IRA. In
addition, the oldest participants in our survey may have defined benefit rather than defined contribution plans and have
other financial investments.
To better understand these findings and their implications,
we turn to additional information, which is summarized in Figure 1. The NFCS asks survey participants if they were offered
100
This finding is consistent with other research reporting a persistent gender
gap in financial literacy. See, e.g., Gary Mottola, Gender, Generation and Financial Knowledge: A Six-Year Perspective, FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND. INSIGHTS: FIN.
CAPABILITY (March 2018), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/Issue-Brief-Gender-Generation-and-Financial-Knowledge-A-Six-Year-Perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XHX-XMU7] (finding that NFCS data reveal a
persistent financial literacy gender gap between 2009 and 2015). Commentators
have suggested women may be less exposed to financial education through the
workplace. See Dawn Doebler, 12 Reasons Women Need to Close the Financial
Literacy Gap, WTOP (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://wtop.com/business-finance/2018/09/12-reasons-women-need-to-close-the-financial-literacy-gap/
[https://perma.cc/CX6F-J7LL]. Importantly, however, our findings suggest that
women’s exposure to 401(k) plans does not address the gender gap.
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financial education either in school or college or in their workplace. Not surprisingly, we find that workplace-only investors
were much less likely to be exposed to financial education (Figure 1). Only about 30% of workplace-only investors were offered financial education versus about 45% of all other
investors. This may explain their lower levels of financial literacy and also why these low levels of financial knowledge persist
until an older age.
FIGURE 1: Financial Education Offered in School or the
Workplace Across Investor Groups
50%
45%

43%

45%

46%
40%

40%
32%

35%

31%

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
(1) Active
investor in
financial
market or
retirement

(2) Active in
retirement
savings

(3) Active (4) Workplace- (5) Investor
investors only investors population
in financial
market

(6) General
population

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. The numbers in the figure represent the percentages of investors who
were offered financial education. The percentages are shown in relation to the
particular investor sample (for example, 31% of workplace-only investors were
offered financial education). In order to keep the investor samples consistent
across the various analyses in this paper, the “do not know” and “prefer not to
say” responses to the financial education question are not excluded from the
investor samples. The exact question asked to measure who were offered financial
education is “Was financial education offered by a school or college you attended,
or a workplace where you were employed?”

We examine next some proxies for personal finances and
personal financial management to assess whether workplaceonly investors are also less attentive when it comes to other
financial decisions. This is important because other decisions
about personal finances, not just retirement savings, can influence whether individuals can achieve a secure retirement. The
results are reported in Table 4. In Table 4a, we report the list of
assets and liabilities that workplace-only and active investors
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hold, and, in Table 4b, we report some proxies for financial
management.
TABLE 4A: Assets and Liabilities Across Investor Groups

Assets
Has a
checking or
savings
account
Has a
retirement
account
Owns a home
Liabilities
Has credit
card debt*
Has an auto
loan
Has a student
loan
Has a home
mortgage*
Observations

(1)
Active
investor in
financial
markets or
ret.
savings

(2)
Active in
retirement
savings

(3)
Active
investors
in
financial
market

(4)
Workplaceonly
investors

(5)
(6)
Investor
Total
population population

99.22%

99.15%

99.55%

98.39%

98.98%

93.49%

93.08%

100%

90.60%

100%

95.05%

61.82%

78.01%

80.24%

79.90%

64.96%

74.29%

59.42%

46.09%

44.27%

44.08%

64.80%

51.11%

53.70%

42.88%

43.67%

43.57%

50.29%

44.99%

35.65%

31.78%

31.13%

32.56%

37.28%

33.35%

31.46%

70.64%

71.96%

69.66%

77.23%

72.28%

68.13%

6,322

4,892

4,574

2,459

8,781

14,640

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. The variable “has a retirement account” refers to both employer-sponsored plans and private retirement accounts. Variables with an asterisk indicate
that the statistics are conditional on having the related asset. The total number of
observations relate to the statistics of the variables without asterisk. In order to
keep the investor samples consistent across the various analyses in this paper,
the “do not know” and “prefer not to say” responses to the asset and liability
questions are not excluded from the investor samples.
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TABLE 4B: Management of Personal Finances Across
Investor Groups
(1)
(2)
Active
Active in
investor in retirement
savings
financial
markets or
ret.
savings
Checking account mgmt.
Occasionally
19.94%
overdraws
checking
accounts*
Credit card mgmt.
Has made only
the minimum
payment*
Charged a fee
for late
payment*
Charged an
over-the-limit
fee*
Charged fee for
cash advances*
Demonstrated
at least one
expensive
behavior*
Retirement savings
Took a loan*
Made a
hardship
withdrawal*
Made some
form of
withdrawal*

(4)
(5)
(6)
WorkplaceInvestor
Total
population population
only
investors

19.65%

21.79%

24.87%

21.34%

22.30%

27.87%

26.29%

27.18%

46.28%

32.80%

38.10%

14.16%

14.57%

14.54%

17.07%

14.94%

16.43%

9.88%

11.20%

10.98%

7.51%

9.24%

9.39%

12.85%

12.80%

13.70%

12.03%

12.63%

12.55%

35.96%

34.07%

35.47%

51.16%

40.03%

44.73%

mgmt.
15.11%
12.43%

16.06%
13.63%

17.34%
14.71%

11.24%
6.19%

13.92%
10.52%

13.92%
10.52%

18.08%

18.97%

20.04%

14.38%

16.94%

16.94%

26.02%

26.20%

24.78%

29.31%

4,574

2,459

8,781

14,640

Use of alternative financial services
Used at least
24.22%
23.49%
one form of
alternative
financial
services
Observations

(3)
Active
investors
in
financial
market

6,322

4,892

Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. All variables related to managing personal finances refer to the past year
except for the use of alternative financial services which refers to the past 5 years.
Alternative financial services include auto title loans, payday loans, pawn shops, and
rent-to-own stores. The variables related to retirement savings refer to both employersponsored plans and private retirement accounts. Variables with an asterisk indicate
that the statistics are conditional on having the related asset. The total number of
observations relate to the statistics of the variables without asterisk. In order to keep
the investor samples consistent across the various analyses in this paper, the “do not
know” and “prefer not to say” responses to the questions used to construct the variables in the table are not excluded from the investor samples.
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There are some noteworthy findings here as well to understand the differences between workplace-only investors and
other investors. Workplace-only investors are less likely to own
assets, such as a house, than active investors. They are also
substantially more likely than active investors to be in debt and
carry different types of debt, from student loans to mortgages (if
they own a home), to auto loans. When it comes to debt, the
financial situation of workplace-only investors appears, in the
ways measured here, to be worse than even the general
population.
Workplace-only investors are also particularly likely to
carry credit card debt, which is a concern because of the higher
rate of interest typically associated with credit card debt. To
better consider the management of credit cards, in Table 4b we
look at what one of us has dubbed expensive credit card behavior, i.e., paying the minimum only, going over the limit, using
the card for a cash advance, and paying fees for late payments.101 What we find is that workplace-only investors exhibit a behavior that is conducive to paying high interest rates
and fees on credit cards.
A variety of additional evidence suggests that workplaceonly investors are less likely to be financially savvy, more likely
to face liquidity constraints, or both. About a quarter of workplace-only investors overdraw from their checking accounts. A
quarter of them also use alternative financial services, such as
payday loans, auto title loans, pawn shops or rent-to-own
shops, which charge very high interest rates, often well above
100%. Interestingly, workplace-only investors are less likely to
borrow against their retirement accounts, for example taking
out a loan or making a hardship withdrawal, even though borrowing from a retirement account is likely to involve lower costs
than using alternative financial services or borrowing using
credit cards.
In sum, our results demonstrate that workplace-only investors differ from other, more active investors not just in financial decisions with respect to their retirement accounts but
also in financial decisions related to the management of their
assets and liabilities. Debt, in particular, is a concern as workplace-only investors carry different types of debt, some of which
charges high rates of interest. This evidence speaks of the
importance for financial education, in particular for workplaceonly investors, a topic that we address in Part V below.
101
See Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and Overindebtedness, 14 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 332, 349 (2015).
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IV
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL ILLITERACY FOR 401(K)
INVESTING
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, U.S. retirement
savings has evolved into a system that imposes substantial
responsibility on individual employees to determine how much
to save and how to invest that money. Our results pose several
critical challenges for such a system. First, as noted above,
financial illiteracy impedes plan participants’ ability to determine what is the best use of 401(k) plan, for example, how to
invest their savings. ERISA explicitly relies on employee choice
as the basis for limiting the employers’ fiduciary responsibilities with respect to defined contribution plans,102 but limited
financial literacy suggests a level of incapacity that renders
true employee choice illusory.
Historically, the ERISA standard has relied heavily on the
importance of participant choice. Employer responsibility
under ERISA’s fiduciary standard is limited, so long as the
employer offers participants reasonable investment options.103
The financial illiteracy of plan participants raises questions
about their ability to exercise reasonable choice, however. If
plan participants lack the ability to distinguish between investment options and reject inferior or inappropriate choices, it is
arguably problematic for a plan to include those choices, and it
may not be reasonable for courts or regulators to accept a plan
merely on the basis that it contains some high-quality options.104 In addition, the literature has demonstrated that,
probably because of low financial literacy, the menu of investment options offered by a plan can affect participant decisions—menus matter.105
On the other hand, excessive judicial scrutiny of plan composition raises a competing set of issues. If the employer has
an obligation to choose what is, in its view, the most appropriate investments for its employees, that role substantially erodes participant choice, which is the bedrock of the defined
102

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2018).
See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 325–27 (3d Cir. 2011)
(highlighting the relevance of the reasonableness of available investment options
when evaluating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA).
104
See Ayres & Curtis, supra note 55, at 1504–05 (describing inferior funds as
“dominated funds” and arguing that it is a potential breach of an employer’s
fiduciary duty to include dominated funds in a 401(k) plan).
105
Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4–5, 8 (2006).
103
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contribution model.106 Moreover, there are a variety of reasons
to prefer a choice-preserving approach, including the inability
of courts, regulators, and employers to determine accurately
the best interests of plan participants.107
These concerns are magnified in the context of plans that,
as a practical matter, rely primarily on paternalistic employer
choices rather than actual participant choice. With auto-enrollment and auto-escalation and default investment options,
employers are the ones deciding whether their employees will
save for retirement, how much they will save, and how that
money should be invested. In these plans, the employee effectively has decisions about whether and how to invest made for
him or her. Although employees can, in theory, reject their
employers’ decisions, financially illiterate plan participants are
poorly positioned to do so. These innovations in the structure
of 401(k) plans thus raise the question of the extent of an
employer’s obligation to validate the choices made for its employees. ERISA’s fiction that employees can protect themselves
from bad or inappropriate choices by opting out seems particularly inapposite. Indeed, opt ins are designed to alleviate inaction by employees; this inaction is likely to limit opt out as well,
which refutes the proposition that a failure to opt out reflects
an informed choice by the employee.
Moreover, while paternalistic responses such as auto-enrollment may provide a partial solution to financial illiteracy by
causing a higher percentage of employees to save for retirement
and by defaulting them into a reasonable investment option,
they focus employers primarily on their employees’ initial enrollment and investment decisions. The limited ability of plan
participants to navigate the challenges of retirement investing
has implications that extend beyond those initial decisions,
however.
One concern is that, over the course of a plan participant’s
career, they may need to adjust the amount that they save for
retirement or the manner in which they invest that savings.
The stickiness of defaults such as savings amounts and target
date fund investments may suggest to employees that the
structure of the plan is consistent with their individual inter106
But see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 60, at 1601 (arguing that, where participants are unlikely to act in a welfare-maximizing manner, deference to their
choice is inappropriate).
107
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210,
211 (2013–2014) (identifying a variety of reasons for preferring a choice-based
approach to a mandate).
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ests. But the use of defaults is premised on the assumption
that employees can determine whether the defaults are appropriate, and in many cases, the low levels of financial literacy
suggest they cannot. Auto-escalation provisions respond to the
stickiness of the initial default but may increase the employee’s
willingness to defer to the automatic components of the plan
and may lead to an increase in debt, reducing the increase in
net savings.
The problem that one size does not fit all with respect to
retirement savings heightens this concern. Although it may be
relatively straightforward to design a reasonable default strategy for entry-level employees, many of which are young, have
limited savings, may carry student loans, and can be expected
to work for thirty or forty years, the situations of plan participants become more varied as they age. Their health, financial
status and debt obligations, sources of income, dependents,
and other factors affect the appropriate savings rate and level
of risk in their retirement accounts. Paternalism that defaults
employees into a generic retirement plan without providing
them with the tools to determine if adjustments to that default
are appropriate may do little to help workers and may even
hurt them.108 As discussed in more detail later, employees
frequently change employers, and employers face today a heterogeneous population of employees.
A second and perhaps greater concern is that, to the extent
that participants are successful in accumulating a large balance for retirement in their 401(k) plans, they then become
responsible for deciding what to do with that money when retiring or changing jobs. Nothing in the existing regulatory structure creates a role for the employer in assisting its employees
with decisions about how to use that account balance to fund
their retirement, including deciding whether to roll over the
account, determining how much to withdraw and figuring out
how to invest what is, for most retirees, more money than they
have ever been responsible before.109 As early plan participants begin to retire, their experiences are highlighting new
vulnerabilities including the risk that they will be persuaded to
roll their 401(k) assets over into an account that charges them
108
The high proportion of Americans carrying high-cost debt is one reason for
concern about policies that focus on only one component of people’s financial
wellbeing.
109
Zelinksy, supra note 37, at 456–57 (“Typically the distribution from a defined contribution plan today takes the form of a single lump sum payout of the
employee’s account balance rather than an annuity or other periodic distribution
spread over time.”).
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substantially higher fees,110 the risk that they will be persuaded to invest in unsuitable products that they do not understand, and the risk that they will be the victims of outright
fraud.111
IRA rollovers offer an example of the challenges faced by
401(k) plan participants, challenges that are exacerbated by
financial illiteracy. Upon retirement, a 401(k) participant typically has the choice of whether to keep their money in their
employer’s plan or to roll it over into an individual retirement
account or IRA. An IRA allows the retiree access to the services
of professional financial adviser as well as, in most case, a
greater variety of investment options than are available in a
typical 401(k) plan.112 In most cases, however, IRAs also involve higher fees.113
In any given case, the decision to roll over a 401(k) account
depends in part on whether the higher fees associated with the
IRA are cost-justified in terms of the retiree’s access to better
advice or products. But IRAs are particularly problematic in
that the primary source of information on this trade-off is the
outside adviser, whose compensation depends on whether he
or she is successful in persuading the retiree to roll the money
over.114 The adviser is therefore subject to a serious conflict of
interest, which is magnified by the economic importance of
rollovers to the financial services industry; the vast majority of
the money in IRA accounts is not additional money that customers have saved independently but rather money that has
been rolled over from a 401(k) account.115
110
See Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Speech at the Am. Retirement Initiative’s Winter 2014 Summit: Protecting the Financial Future of Seniors
and Retirees (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014spch020414laa [https://perma.cc/AYL8-PG89] (warning that “the SEC will examine the sales practices of investment advisers that are targeting retirement-age
workers to rollover their employer-sponsored 401(k) plans into higher cost
investments”).
111
See Marguerite DeLiema, Martha Deevy, Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S.
Mitchell, Financial Fraud Among Older Americans: Evidence and Implications, 75
J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 861 (2020).
112
See John A. Turner, The Pension Mis-Selling Scandal, the SEC, and the
Fiduciary Standard, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 263, 269–71 (2016).
113
See, e.g., Anne Tergesen & Anna Prior, The New Regulatory Hurdle for IRAs,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iras-have-a-regulatory-headache-coming-1459108346 [https://perma.cc/QT6N-AA3B] (noting that
IRAs often hold higher fee investments than 401(k) plans); Turner, supra note
112, at 263 (comparing fees associated with 401(k) plans with those commonly
paid for IRAs).
114
See Turner, supra note 112, at 265–66.
115
Tergesen & Prior, supra note 113 (observing that “rollovers now account for
more than 90% of the money flowing into IRAs each year”).
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In the face of this conflict, financially illiterate employees
are particularly at risk. Some financial advisers have taken
advantage of this vulnerability—offering retirees bonuses and
free products as incentives to roll over their 401(k) plans,116 the
value of which are dwarfed by the high fees that the adviser
subsequently collects on the account.117
Existing evidence suggests that a substantial number of
people are moving money from their employer-sponsored plans
into higher cost alternatives,118 but whether those alternatives
are beneficial remains unclear. This is an important consideration because it is not always the case that financially illiterate
employees follow the path of least resistance—in this case staying in the employer sponsored plans—when becoming the target of unscrupulous financial advisers. The concern is
sufficient that the DOL’s now-defunct fiduciary rule119 dealt
specifically with rollovers, both requiring an investment adviser
to obtain information prior to recommending a rollover and
applying a fiduciary standard to the adviser’s recommendation.
Retirees will also face the decision of whether to withdraw
the money from retirement accounts as a lump sum, to make
withdrawals on a periodic or as-needed basis, or to invest in

116
See, e.g., Kevin Mercadante, These 5 Brokers Will Pay You to Rollover Your
IRA, MONEYUNDER30 (May 25, 2017), https://www.moneyunder30.com/ira-rollover-promotions [https://perma.cc/FR5G-64LA] (last modified Oct. 17, 2019)
(describing cash incentives offered by six brokers to persuade investors to roll over
the assets in their 401(k) accounts).
117
See Anne Tergesen, Be Wary of Financial Firms’ 401(k) Rollover Advice,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/be-wary-offinancial-firms-401k-rollover-advice-2014-12-04 [https://perma.cc/D2QWSHE2] (observing that “many participants in 401(k) plans—particularly those in
plans sponsored by large companies, which frequently offer bargain-priced institutional funds—could be shortchanged by switching to an IRA”).
118
IRA assets are projected to increase to $12.6 trillion by 2022, and the
overwhelming majority of IRA contributions currently are the result of rollovers
from 401(k) plans. See Greg Iacurci, IRA Assets Will Almost Double Those in
401(k) Plans Over Next Five Years, INV. NEWS (June 25, 2018), https://
www.investmentnews.com/article/20180625/FREE/180629951/ira-assets-willalmost-double-those-in-401-k-plans-over-next-five [https://perma.cc/7KSV7Z6B].
119
In 2016, the Department of Labor adopted the Fiduciary Rule. Definition of
the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice
(Final Fiduciary Definition), 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016). Subsequently, a
federal court invalidated the rule in Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dept. of Labor,
885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018). Following the ruling, the US Department of Labor
announced that it did not intend to enforce the rule. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD
ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-02 (May 7, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-02
[https://perma.cc/3H32-WRXA].
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annuities, which are complex financial products.120 These are
areas where the adoption of defaults or automatic enrollment
cannot easily be implemented as a substitute for participant
choice. In particular, the determination of which of these options is preferable depends on a personalized analysis of an
individual’s financial condition. In addition, a number of these
decisions such as the decision to roll money over into an IRA or
to purchase an annuity are costly or impossible to reverse.121
Finally, for those simply changing jobs, they have to decide
what to do with their accumulated retirement savings. This
may involve managing multiple retirement accounts from different employers. An employee may also need to analyze, in
light of their retirement plan from their prior employer, how to
make the current employer’s policy for enrollment, contributions, and investment in retirement accounts fit their specific
needs.
V
IMPROVING RETIREMENT INVESTING THROUGH 401(K)
PLANS
As the foregoing parts have detailed, the financial literacy
of workplace-only investors threatens the effectiveness of a
participant-directed approach to retirement savings. This part
identifies two possible responses. In subpart V.A we consider
increasing employer responsibility for the appropriateness of
their 401(k) programs. Alternatively, in subpart V.B we evaluate the potential for employers to address the deficiencies in
their employees’ financial literacy through financial education
programs.

120
See, e.g., Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 71 (2014) (observing that “annuities have grown more
complex” and describing various types of annuities).
121
Most annuities are subject to a substantial surrender charge if the
purchase seeks to cash in the policy early, that is, prior to the end of a designated
“surrender period.” In addition, because of their complexity and the distribution
channels through which they are sold, fraudulent practices are common. See
Joseph H. Aughtman, The Annuity Conundrum: Responding to the Abuse of Elderly Investors, 38 BRIEF 38, 39 (2008) (“[W]ith a frequency that is disturbing,
annuities are being used as instruments to defraud investors.”); Fischler v. Amsouth Bancorporation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14,
1996) (rejecting motion to dismiss securities fraud claim based on failure to disclose the surrender charge in connection with the sale of an annuity).
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Employer Responsibility as a Substitute for Employee
Financial Literacy

One possible solution to the financial illiteracy of involuntary investors is to place greater responsibility on employers to
ensure that their employees are investing appropriately for retirement. The limited fiduciary responsibilities imposed by ERISA, which rely on participant control, may be inappropriate in
an environment in which participants are unable to exercise
effective control and rely, directly or indirectly, on their employers to protect their interests. In this context, traditional fiduciary duties rather than judicial deference to employee judgment
may be appropriate.
Greater employer responsibility could take several forms.
Congress could narrow or eliminate the ERISA safe harbor for
participant-directed plans. The courts could modify their interpretation of the existing safe harbor and reject the argument
that participant choice is an adequate remedy for poor plan
menus or the inclusion of high cost funds. As an alternative to
a hard-to-apply fiduciary standard, ERISA could impose more
detailed requirements concerning the structure of 401(k)
plans. For example, the Department of Labor could validate
particular investment options as suitable for inclusion in a
401(k) plan based on factors such as cost, asset mix, and
risk.122
ERISA could also require employers to oversee or ensure
the appropriateness of the choices made by their employees. It
could impose an obligation on employers to ensure that employees met minimum savings thresholds, through mechanisms such as mandating higher participation rates, requiring
employer matching, or requiring employers to meet shortfalls
in instances in which employees are unable to save enough
through their own contributions. These obligations would extend employer responsibility beyond the standards that are
currently required by ERISA and that have been the subject of
recent litigation.
There are two primary obstacles to using greater employer
responsibility to address the current problems with retirement
122
The Department of Labor currently does something analogous to this by
approving qualified default investment alternatives for 401(k) plans that provide
automatic enrollment. See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT
SHEET: DEFAULT INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES UNDER PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNT PLANS (Sept. 2006), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/
our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/default-investment-alternativesunder-participant-directed-individual-account-plans [https://perma.cc/4MQYN96H].
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investing. The first is the challenge of identifying a workable
standard of conduct.123 As existing litigation in this area demonstrates, it is difficult to design a perfect retirement plan—
questions such as the choice of investment options and fee
structure involve predictions about the future state of the
world, predictions about employee behavior, and policy choices
about the most appropriate structure to accommodate employees with different needs and preferences. A standard that critically evaluated the quality of an employer’s plan design would
be judicially unmanageable. As the court noted in Sweda,
there are a variety of rational choices that an employer or plan
administrator can make in designing a plan.124 Related is the
problem that the employer’s decisions will be challenged after
the fact, leading to the risk of hindsight bias. The fact that
some choices work out better than others with the benefit of
hindsight125 or benefit some employees more than others does
not make a decision unreasonable.126
The second problem with imposing greater employer responsibility is that the most likely consequence of such liability
would be a substantial decrease in employers’ willingness to
provide retirement plans to their employees. It is important to
keep in mind that employers have discretion as to whether to
provide 401(k) plans as an employee benefit. Both the direct
costs of meeting additional regulatory requirements and the
indirect costs of liability exposure under such a regime would
be substantial and would increase the costs to an employer of
providing a plan. The natural result would be fewer employersponsored plans. Because many employees are unlikely to
save adequately for retirement outside an employer-sponsored
plan, a decline in the availability of employer plans could reduce overall retirement savings, and the cost of insufficient
savings would eventually be borne by taxpayers generally.
123
Cf. Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 TUL. L. REV. 339, 356–61 (2017) (identifying problems with applying the standard of conduct contemplated by the Department of Labor’s Fiduciary
Rule to advisers’ relationships with their retirement customers).
124
See Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 16-4329, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958, at
*4–7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017).
125
In addition, as the Sweda court observed, the fact that a plan’s investments underperform the market is not an indication of inappropriate decisionmaking. Standard statistics would predict that half of all investments would
underperform the median. Id. at *29–30.
126
See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 338 (8th Cir. 2014) (“While it
is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc. at $7 a share in
December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share), selecting an investment
beforehand is difficult.”).
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Similarly, it would be problematic to impose liability on
employers that implement auto-enrollment or auto-escalation
features. The evidence indicates that these features lead to
higher rates of employee participation, and employees are
clearly better off saving for retirement than not. To the extent
regulatory changes are warranted, they should be directed at
enabling plan participants to navigate the retirement planning
process more effectively, not penalizing employers for responding to financial illiteracy in an imperfect manner. Accordingly,
we argue that mandated employer-based literacy education
rather than heightened employer liability is the appropriate
response to financial illiteracy, a response that we develop in
the next section.
B.

Formalizing the Employer’s Role in Evaluating and
Remediating Financial Illiteracy by Plan
Participants

Existing levels of financial literacy undermine the theory of
participant choice upon which ERISA’s current approach to
defined contribution plans is based. Our data show that a
substantial percentage of plan participants are financially illiterate and that, in a sense, many participants are victims of a
regulatory structure that requires them to manage critical decisions regarding retirement planning without preparing them to
make those decisions competently. The solution, we suggest,
is for ERISA or the Department of Labor to mandate financial
education, as a component of employer provided defined contribution plans.
1.

The Importance of Financial Literacy for Appropriate
Retirement Savings and Investment

Research on financial literacy points to the importance of
financial knowledge for savvy investment and other behavior.
Many studies, not just in the United States but around the
world, show there is a strong effect of financial literacy both on
whether individuals invest in stocks127 and on the return they
earn on their portfolios; those who are more financially literate
are more likely to invest in the stock market and to earn a
127
See generally Joanne Yoong, Financial Illiteracy and Stock Market Participation: Evidence from the RAND American Life Panel, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 76 (Olivia S. Mitchell
& Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011) (discussing relationship between financial literacy and stock market participation).
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higher rate of return, controlling for risk.128 Financial literacy
also affects portfolio choices; those who are more financially
literate are more likely to invest in ways that minimize fees and
avoid extreme positions (for example investing 0% or 100% of
their portfolio in risky assets, such as stocks or stock mutual
funds).129
Financial literacy is also linked to responsible behavior related to retirement savings. Specifically, those who are more
financially literate are more likely to plan for retirement.130
This is consequential for retirement savings because those who
plan for retirement accumulate two to three times more wealth
than nonplanners.131 Those who are more financially literate
are also less likely to withdraw from their retirement accounts,
making it more likely that employees get to retirement with
higher amounts of retirement savings.132
Financial literacy is also linked not only to long-term savings, but to short-term savings as well, such as precautionary
savings which increases an investor’s ability to face a financial
shock. For example, those who are more financially literate are
more likely to be able to come up with money if an unexpected
shock were to hit, and less likely to rely on borrowing, including tapping into their retirement accounts.133
Financial literacy is linked to another important aspect of
behavior, i.e., debt and debt management. This is important
because, as mentioned above, retirement savings and debt are
found to be closely linked, and those who have more retirement
savings also have more debt. Recent research shows that those
who are less financially literate are more likely to carry debt
close to retirement when, in fact, people should be close to the
128
See Robert Clark et al., Financial Knowledge and 401(k) Investment Performance: A Case Study, 16 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 324, 357 (2017).
129
See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 637 (using experimental evidence to
show that “financially illiterate investors allocate too little money to equity, engage
in naive diversification, fail to identify dominated funds, and are inattentive to
fees.” (footnote omitted)).
130
See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 6, at 518.
131
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning: Implications for Retirement Well-Being, in FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 127, at 17.
132
See Ashley Ann Tharayil & William B. Walstad, The Effect of Financial
Literacy on Withdrawing Funds Intended for Retirement—Conclusions Drawn
from Three Years of Data 15–18 (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (Am.
Econ. Ass’n Paper Session).
133
See ANDREA HASLER, ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & NOEMI OGGERO, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
IN THE US: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (Apr. 2018), https://gflec.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/04/Financial-Fragility-Research-Paper-04-16-2018-Final.
pdf?x37292 [https://perma.cc/GQ58-WVTN].
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peak of their wealth accumulation.134 Most importantly, financial illiteracy is found to be closely linked to poor debt management, such as behavior associated with paying high interest
costs, fees and going over pre-set borrowing limits.135 It has
also been associated with using high-cost methods of borrowing, such as relying on payday loans or using pawn shops,
methods that charge interest rates often well above 100%.136
It is certainly difficult to distinguish causality from correlation, and one can argue that both financial literacy and active
investing are the products of individual investor choice; in
other words, individuals can invest in both knowledge and financial assets. However, studies that have addressed the issue of causality have shown not only that the causality runs
from financial literacy to financial behavior (rather than the
other way around), but also that the original estimates that did
not account for the endogeneity of financial literacy may have
led to an underestimation of the effects of financial literacy on
saving, investment, and planning behavior.137 Simply stated,
it is hard to imagine that ignorance is bliss when it comes to
investment, and that employees could get to the right investment for them without having any knowledge of the basic principles of finance. And financial ignorance, in particular of the
concepts related to investment decisions, is well documented in
all of the studies we have reviewed.
Empirical estimates notwithstanding, theoretical models of
saving also highlight the critical importance of financial literacy. If, as empirical studies show, financial literacy allows individuals to participate in financial markets and earn a higher
rate of return on their investments than nonliterate individuals, the effects on retirement savings are very consequential.
According to the estimates of Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell,
financial literacy can account for 30 to 40% of the inequality of
retirement savings as employees approach retirement.138

134
See Annamaria Lusardi et al., The Changing Face of Debt and Financial
Fragility at Older Ages, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 407, 407
(2018).
135
See Lusardi & Tufano, supra note 101, at 349.
136
See Annamaria Lusardi & Carlo de Bassa Scheresberg, Financial Literacy
and High-Cost Borrowing in the United States 12–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 18969, 2013).
137
See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 27.
138
Annamaria Lusardi et al., Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Inequality, 125 J. POL. ECON. 431, 433 (2017).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt

2020]
2.

unknown

Seq: 43

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN

10-AUG-20

12:10

783

The Role of Financial Education in Improving Financial
Literacy

Another way to understand the importance of financial literacy is to examine the effects of programs designed to boost
financial knowledge. Several states in the United States have
made financial literacy mandatory in high school.139 Financial
education programs are also provided in colleges and universities140 and the workplace.141
Measuring the effectiveness of financial education programs is complex because a number of confounding factors
can affect how participants respond to these programs.142 For
example, selection issues may confound the results—those
who attend may be disproportionately motivated or, alternatively, the least financially literate. One way of addressing
these issues is through randomized controlled trials (RCT),
which are considered the gold standard of evaluations.143
Early studies found limited effects from financial education
programs, leading some to conclude that there was no value to
financial education.144 In some cases this might have been due
to the details of the programs, which often cannot be assessed,
139
According to the most recent Council for Economic Education’s Survey of
the States, seventeen states require high school students to take a course in
personal finance. COUNCIL FOR ECON. EDUC., SURVEY OF THE STATES, ECONOMIC AND
PERSONAL FINANCE IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS (2018), http://www.councilforeconed.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2018-SOS-Layout-18.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GY4P-DKV5].
140
See, e.g., Ted Beck, How to Help Colleges Teach Financial Literacy, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 6, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/08/06/how-to-help-col
leges-teach-financial-literacy/ [https://perma.cc/TNR9-HPXY] (observing that
“[n]ow there are literally hundreds of institutions taking responsibility” for financial education).
141
See, e.g., Chloe Skaar, More Companies Are Offering Financial Education for
Employees, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 28, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.dispatch.
com/business/20180628/more-companies-are-offering-financial-education-foremployees [https://perma.cc/HC2X-NQGB] (reporting that employers are increasingly offering financial education programs to their employees).
142
See Justine S. Hastings, Brigitte C. Madrian & William L. Skimmyhorn,
Financial Literacy, Financial Education and Economic Outcomes, 5 ANN. REV. ECON.
347, 359–61 (2013) (observing that the existing literature on the effects of financial education programs is mixed and inconclusive and that “this literature needs
additional large-scale randomized interventions designed to effectively identify
causal effects”).
143
See, e.g., Tim Kaiser & Lukas Menkhoff, Does Financial Education Impact
Financial Literacy and Financial Behavior, and if So, When?, 31 WORLD BANK ECON.
REV. 611, 615–17 (2017) (observing that studies involving RCTs show highly significant effects of financial education on financial behavior).
144
See Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch Jr. & Richard G. Netemeyer, Financial Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 MGMT.
SCI. 1861, 1862 (2014).
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because the majority of studies lack specific program information about, for example, quality of the material, program intensity, and teacher training.145 In addition, studies often
aggregated the results across the entire group of participants
without considering the possibility that the programs could
have affected particular groups differently, such as those who
were the least financially literate. A recent comprehensive
meta-analysis of the effects of financial education shows that
not only do financial education programs work, but also that
the details of the programs matter substantially.146
Recent work on financial education also shows that implementation is critically important.147 For example, financial education in school is found to be most effective when financial
education is a required course with a rigorous curriculum and
where the teachers are trained to teach financial literacy.148
While these findings are hardly surprising, they confirm that
evaluations of the effect of financial education need to be rigorous and take into account the characteristics and quality of the
program as well as the well-documented differences in financial
literacy across demographic groups. The importance of financial literacy in school is also confirmed by the mounting evidence that is now emerging around the world; many studies
have found similar and even stronger effects of financial education in school in other countries.149 Further indirect evidence
of its importance is that, since 2012, the OECD has added
financial literacy to the topics it measures in its Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA), assessing the readiness of high school students around the world.150
145
See, e.g., Wendy L. Way & Karen C. Holden, Teachers’ Background and
Capacity to Teach Personal Finance: Results of a National Study, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 64, 66–75 (2009) (examining data from more than 1,200 K–12
teachers, prospective teachers, and teacher education faculty representing four
census regions and finding that fewer than one-fifth stated they were prepared to
teach personal finance).
146
See Kaiser & Menkhoff, supra note 143, at 626–28.
147
Carly Urban, Maximilian Schmeiser, J. Michael Collins & Alexandra
Brown, State Financial Education Mandates: It’s All in the Implementation, FINRA
INV. EDU. FOUND. (Jan. 2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/investoreducationfoundation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9535-APWY].
148
Carly Urban et al., The Effects of High School Personal Financial Education
Policies on Financial Behavior, ECON. EDUC. REV. (2018), https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.03.006 [https://perma.cc/U8PE-9WNV].
149
Verónica Frisancho, The Impact of School-Based Financial Education on
High School Students and Their Teachers: Experimental Evidence from Peru 3–4
(Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 871, 2018).
150
Launch: OECD PISA Financial Literacy Assessment of Students, ORG. ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-education/
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Some studies have assessed the effectiveness of financial
education in the workplace. Studies here are more heterogeneous, and many programs have not been evaluated or evaluated
rigorously, but the existing evidence shows that financial education in the workplace holds much promise.151 In the following subpart we elaborate from the research findings and our
own experience working with both firms and financial market
regulators to offer some initial components of an effective employer-provided financial education program.
3.

Key Components of Employer-Provided Financial
Education

The existing research points to three components of an
effective employer-provided financial education program that
could be implemented by all employers: (1) a self-assessment,
(2) minimum requirements about the content of programs, and
(3) timing—when the program and components of the programs should be provided.
Starting with the first, we recommend that employers be
required to provide a self-assessment enabling their employees
to measure their financial knowledge and capability. We now
have validated ways to measure financial literacy—a set of
questions has been tested in many national surveys and has
provided robust findings.152 An assessment can serve several
purposes; it could be the first step toward segmenting workers
into different types of financial education programs targeted to
different needs and different levels of financial knowledge. It
could also provide a simple way for both employer and employees to be informed and track progress over time. A self-assessment also makes it possible for those who can demonstrate
financial knowledge to opt out of simple programs or participate only in parts of the program. Self-assessments could extend to financial behavior, in addition to financial knowledge,
and become a financial check-up that employees can take to
assess the state of their finances on a regular basis.
launch-pisa-financial-literacy-students-2017.htm [https://perma.cc/KR39K44Z].
151
See Kaiser & Menkhoff, supra note 143, at 612 (providing meta-analysis of
126 studies of financial education and concluding that the studies are highly
heterogeneous but generally support the idea that financial education, including
education done in the workplace, can be effective).
152
Some large firms are already using financial literacy questions, such as the
Big Three, to measure financial knowledge among their employees. See Lusardi &
Mitchell, supra note 94, at 498–99.
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Second, as for the program content, the Department of
Labor could introduce minimum requirements as to what
should be included in a program to provide the working knowledge and skills necessary to navigate the defined contribution
system.153 These requirements could include both specific information about the 401(k) plan, the investment options contained in that plan, and the process of saving and investing for
retirement. They could also extend to more general components of personal financial decision-making that contribute to
an employee’s financial well-being.
Academic research indicates that effective financial education programs should extend beyond retirement savings or investing,154 because poor financial decisions of all kinds can
influence retirement savings both directly and indirectly. For
example, an employee’s decision to purchase a house or automobile and to incur debt in connection with that purchase can
affect how much that employee can contribute to a retirement
account, because debt is one of the most important reasons
why employees do not contribute to supplementary retirement
accounts.155 Given the cost and prevalence of high cost borrowing and the potential mismanagement of debt, programs
that include debt and debt management can be particularly
important. Moreover, lack of precautionary savings may lead
individuals to tap into retirement accounts prematurely when
they experience financial shocks, making it important for education programs to promote both long-term and short-term
savings.156
The existing research shows that there are many ways in
which financial education can be provided, for example
through on-line programs, videos, or live sessions, either in
individualized or group formats.157 These programs are often
153
The P-Fin Index illustrates the eight areas of working knowledge and what
employees know the least. PAUL J. YAKOBOSKI, ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & ANDREA HASLER, THE 2018 TIAA INSTITUTE-GFLEC PERSONAL FINANCE INDEX, THE STATE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG U.S. ADULTS 1 (Apr. 2018), https://gflec.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/TIAA_GFLEC_Report_PFinIndex_April2018_fin.pdf?x98192
[https://perma.cc/BR5W-YXQK].
154
See Hastings et al., supra note 142, at 358.
155
See Rajashri Chakrabarti et al., Household Debt and Saving During the
2007 Recession 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16999,
2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16999.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5UBGCMW] (explaining that those who decreased net contributions to their retirement
accounts were motivated to reduce debt).
156
About one-third of Americans could not come up with $2,000 in a month, if
they were to face an unexpected need. HASLER ET AL., supra note 133, at 3.
157
Aileen Heinberg et al., Five Steps to Planning Success: Experimental Evidence from U.S. Households, 30 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 697, 699–701 (2014).
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simple, yet effective and not costly. For example, initiatives like
those described in the Five Steps to Planning Success, which
teaches the basics of financial planning in short videos, have
been found to have an effect on financial knowledge.158 Research also shows that some topics, such as risk and risk
diversification, are particularly hard for employees to grasp,159
but that simple tools that help people visualize and simplify the
workings of risk and risk diversification have an effect on financial knowledge.160
In addition, programs can be made more effective if tailored
to the needs of specific employees. For example, young workers may benefit from programs covering student loans and
buying the first home. Women may benefit from programs
about investing and saving for the long term.161 Older workers
may benefit from programs about Social Security, when it is
best to withdraw Social Security benefits, and the workings of
annuities. Older workers may also benefit from programs specially focused on retirement planning such as financial calculators that demonstrate the impact of withdrawals from 401(k)
plans on projected retirement security over time.
Studies also show that employees are demanding financial
education and view the provision of financial education in the
workplace positively.162 For many, workplace-provided programs are the only source of financial education to which they
are exposed. Even so, employee motivation to participate in
financial education programs can be increased through incentives.163 Employers can offer employees financial incentives for
participating in education programs, performance-based incentives such as rewards for success on tests of financial liter158

Id. at 708–15.
See YAKOBOSKI ET AL., supra note 153, at 1 (discussing a personal finance
index as a robust measure of overall personal finance knowledge and a nuanced
analysis of knowledge across different areas of personal finance in which individuals inherently function).
160
Annamaria Lusardi et al., Visual Tools and Narratives: New Ways to Improve Financial Literacy, 16 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 297, 312–15 (2015).
161
As shown earlier, women are those more likely to be passive investors. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
162
Rebecca Estrada, Best Practices for Workplace Financial Education, INT’L
FOUND. EMP. BENEFIT PLANS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://blog.ifebp.org/index.php/
financial-education-workplace-best-practices [https://perma.cc/85M2-PCAL].
163
See generally Providing Incentives for Your Employee Financial Wellness
Program, ENRICH (July 17, 2018), https://www.enrich.org/blog/employee-financial-wellness-program-incentives [https://perma.cc/5M8M-YRME] (describing
potential incentives to increase employee use of workplace financial education
programs).
159
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acy, as well as rewards for demonstrating healthy financial
behaviors over time.
Importantly, an employer-provided financial education
program should be independent in the sense that it should not
steer employees to a particular investment option (particularly
one that provides fees to the sponsor or source of the education
program).164 It is also important to make sure that programs
teach or enable employees to make financial decisions, rather
than preach what is suitable behavior, according to the employer’s perspective.165
Third, timing of financial education programs has been
shown to be extremely important.166 For example, programs
could be provided at the critical moments when financial decisions are made, such as the beginning of employment, at separation, at the time of promotion, or when benefits and health
benefits are reviewed (normally on a yearly basis). Timing of
the programs addresses several of the issues that have been
linked to the effectiveness of financial education, for example
the fact that knowledge may decline with time167 and that education is most effective when it is provided at the time that
people have to make decisions.
While recent research shows that many employers have an
interest in providing financial education to their employees,168
the programs that are offered vary significantly. This creates
164
See Michael Kitces, Financial Literacy Effectiveness & Providing Just-InTime Training By Financial Advisors, KITCES (Sept. 21, 2016, 7:01 AM) https://
www.kitces.com/blog/financial-literacy-program-effectiveness-just-in-timetraining-by-financial-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/F9WN-ND9L] (observing that
“a significant problem with the idea of just-in-time financial education is that it
will often rely on the company providing the product or service to deliver it”).
165
See Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, & Annamaria Lusardi, A
Method for Evaluating the Quality of Financial Decision Making, with an Application to Financial Education 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20618, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20618.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UV7W-5XXK].
166
See, e.g., Karina Harley, The Effects of ‘Just in Time’ Financial Education
Programs on Financial Literacy and Economic Decision-Making in Superannuation 1, 86–87 (2017) (unpublished thesis, Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien), http://
47ctca2fz6ha46w1l826tujxm5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/15/2017/05/Harley-Thesis_Impact-of-just-in-time-financial-education-intervention-on-superannuant-decision-making.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8Z2F-C87P] (describing the importance of providing financial education on a
“just-in-time” basis).
167
See id. at 12 (noting that “[t]here is a significant body of evidence to demonstrate that financial literacy boosted by educational interventions diminishes over
time”).
168
See LORI LUCAS, EBRI’S 2018 EMPLOYER FINANCIAL WELLBEING SURVEY 1, 2–3
(2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_466_
fwrcsur-29nov18.pdf?sfvrsn=bdb23e2f_6 [https://perma.cc/2ZRL-ZGKB].
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different opportunities for employees across firms, but it also
means that a number of employers offer substandard programs
or do not provide any financial education at all.169 Thus, our
recommendation is for the Department of Labor both to mandate employer-provided financial education and to issue a set
of guidelines that govern what is considered an acceptable program, along the same lines in which they have expressed judgments on what are acceptable investment options.
Additionally, guidelines on how to evaluate program success
would assist employers in improving program effectiveness.
One might ask why a mandate is necessary in light of the
market-based trend toward providing workplace-based financial education. We identify several advantages to a regulatory
mandate. First, it would ensure that all workers, not only
those working in big firms or firms providing generous pension
benefits, have access to financial education in the workplace.
For many and, in particular, vulnerable groups, the workplace
may be the only source of financial education. Second, our
proposal leaves room for firm-specific decisions about the details of their financial education, a mandate only sets a floor
with respect to minimum standards. Third, a regulatory mandate encourages market-based innovation. Existing research
is still experimenting to develop what works best in financial
education, and a regulatory requirement provides an incentive
for third party providers to invest in this area. Mandates can
also bolster the exchange of information and experience across
firms, improving the supply and quality of programs over time
and their effectiveness in addressing the needs of workers.170
Finally, a requirement that applies to all firms is necessary
to address worker mobility. Many workers change jobs during
their working career. In the same way in which defined benefit
plans were not an adequate pension system in a dynamic labor
market, defined contribution plans that do not take into consideration the different needs of workers are not adequate for
the current labor force. Using shortcuts to compensate for the
absence of informed participant choice, such as automatic enrollment or default investment options, is particularly problem169

See id. at 12–14.
We note that employers rarely share the details of their programs, although
such information is potentially quite valuable to assist others in designing an
effective program. For an example, see Dara Duguay, Making Financial Education
Work in the Workplace, FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. (Apr. 1, 2011), https://
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-dividend/making-financialeducation-work-in-the-workplace-the-citigroup-experience [https://perma.cc/
4PED-4TE9].
170

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt

790

unknown

Seq: 50

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

10-AUG-20

12:10

[Vol. 105:741

atic if employees stay with the same employer for a short period
of time only. Default options do not address the knowledge
required to make decisions about how to transfer retirement
savings or to manage retirement savings when making job
transitions.
Furthermore, the fact that inadequate retirement savings
and poor investing will require taxpayers to make up for these
mistakes, strengthens the case for mandates. Note that these
are soft mandates; they do not require individuals to save or
invest a specific amount; rather they provide the individuals
with the skills to make the decisions that the new pension
system requires from them.
In addition, although requiring that employers provide financial education is a burden, employers will also benefit from
financial education programs because they will increase the
value of the benefits programs that they provide to their employees. In turn, this will assist employers in recruiting and
retaining employees. In addition, employers obtain value from
worker financial wellbeing because troubling financial situations can affect employees’ performance at work.171 While
these benefits offer employers incentives to implement financial education programs voluntarily, making such programs
mandatory will ensure that all workers can be exposed to financial education.
In summary, as studies of financial education programs
have become methodologically rigorous, they have developed
evidence that financial education offers much promise in addressing financial illiteracy and poor financial decision-making. Financial education programs are not only a step forward
when looking at measures to equip employees to manage their
own retirement accounts and invest their retirement savings
but also a necessary requirement if the objective of defined
contribution pensions is to promote financial security and
make employees save adequately for their retirement. Further,
if insufficient retirement funds strain the welfare system and,
at the end, affect taxpayers, it is important to find ways to
reach as large a share of employees as possible.

171
See, e.g., Kyle Sanders, Is it Time to Offer Financial Education as a Benefit?,
EMP. BENEFIT ADVISOR (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.employeebenefit
adviser.com/opinion/is-it-time-to-offer-financial-education-as-a-benefit [https:/
/perma.cc/ZNE7-6YB2] (reporting that a substantial number of employees suffer
from serious financial stress that interferes with their performance at work).
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CONCLUSION
The structure of U.S. retirement savings has evolved to rely
critically on active participation and informed choices by participants in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. In this Article,
we present new evidence that this structure has introduced a
substantial number of people to the financial markets whose
only contact with those markets is their 401(k) plan and that
these workplace-only investors are both different from other
investors and largely unprepared to make responsible savings
and investment decisions. Despite the limited financial literacy
of workplace-only investors, the existing regulatory structure
largely defers to employee choice to limit the responsibility of
employers for the appropriateness of those decisions.
We challenge this approach, concluding from our empirical
analysis that workplace-only investors are too vulnerable to
take sole responsibility for their current and future financial
well-being. We identify two possible regulatory responses: imposing greater responsibility on plan sponsors to oversee the
quality of employees’ retirement investing or requiring employers to evaluate and remediate the financial literacy of plan participants through investor education. We conclude that the
latter approach is more promising and call for the Department
of Labor to require employer-sponsored financial education.
The financial landscape and labor markets that employees face
today have changed substantially. It is time to change the
regulatory framework to equip workers with the knowledge and
skills they need to make informed decisions about their pensions in the twenty-first century.
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Appendix:
TABLE A1: Comparison of the General Populations Including
“Do Not Know” (DNK) Responses with the General
Population Excluding DNK Responses.
(1)
General
population
incl. DNK
0.3054
0.4416
0.2571
0.3293
0.7512
0.5631

(2)
General
population
excl. DNK
0.3280
0.4669
0.2748
0.3416
0.7674
0.5825

Male
Female

0.4929
0.5071

0.5072
0.4928

White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other

0.6304
0.1197
0.1690
0.0569
0.0239

0.6341
0.1216
0.1661
0.0552
0.0230

25–34 years
35–49 years
50–60 years

0.2996
0.3990
0.3014

0.2915
0.3973
0.3111

Below $25,000
$25,000–$49,000
$50,000–$99,000
Over $100,000

0.2090
0.2517
0.3508
0.1885

0.2185
0.2447
0.3415
0.1953

High school or less
Some college
College graduate or above
Marital status
Married
Single, not married
Divorced or separated
Widowed
Employment
Employed (full, part time)
Self-employed
Unemployed
Not in the labor force
Observations

0.2670
0.4257
0.3074

0.2628
0.4265
0.3107

0.5657
0.3028
0.1161
0.0155

0.5515
0.3109
0.1213
0.0163

0.6315
0.0832
0.0764
0.2089
16,793

0.6379
0.0863
0.0787
0.1971
14,640

Variables
(weighted mean)
Big Three correct
Risk diversification
Asset/Bond pricing
Interest comp.
Mortgage
Inflation
Gender

Ethnicity

Age

Income

Education
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Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study.
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are
weighted. The Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value
1 if the respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions correctly. Income brackets report household annual income from all
sources, such as wages, tips, investment income, public assistance, and retirement plans.
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DATA APPENDIX.
The National Financial Capability Study (NFCS) is the first
and only survey providing detailed information about financial
literacy and financial capability in the United States. The survey, which is supported by FINRA Financial Education Foundation, started in 2009 and is conducted every three years. One
of the authors of this paper (Lusardi) has been the academic
advisor of the survey since its inception and has participated in
the design of the NFCS’s questionnaire — in particular the
parts related to measuring financial literacy and personal finance management. The survey is representative of the U.S.
population, and the data, since 2012, is collected online only.
One of the important features of the data is the large number of
observations, more than 27,000, which make it possible to
study not just the total population but also specific subgroups,
such as those who invest in retirement and other accounts.
To construct our sample, we used data from the latest wave
of the survey, 2015. We restricted the sample to non-retired
respondents in the age group 25–60 to avoid respondents who
are still in school or those very close to retirement or retiring.
We distinguish between different types of investors based on
the questions listed below:
C1) Do you or your [spouse/partner] have any retirement plans
through a current or previous employer, like a pension plan, a
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), or a 401(k)?
[Yes; No; Don’t know; Prefer not to say]
C3) Are any of these retirement plans the kind where you or
your [spouse/partner] get to choose how the money is
invested?
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say]
C4) Do you or your [spouse/partner] have any other retirement
accounts NOT through an employer, like an IRA, Keogh, SEP,
myRA, or any other type of retirement account that you have
set up yourself?
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say]
B14) Not including retirement accounts, does your household
have any investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other
securities?
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say]
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The answers to C4 are used to identify participants who
have set up their own retirement accounts (active investors in
retirement savings). The answer to B14 are used to identify
participants who have private investments other than or in
addition to retirement accounts (active investors in financial
markets). We used the answers to the first two questions
(C1and C3) and also to C4 and B14 to determine workplaceonly investors, i.e., they are those who have a retirement plan
through their employer where they get to choose how the
money is invested but do not have any other retirement accounts or other financial investments in stocks, bonds, mutual
funds and other securities (workplace-only investors).
To construct these definitions of investors, we delete the
“do not know” and “prefer not to say” responses to questions
C3, C4, and B14,172 as otherwise a clear classification would
not have been possible. In some cases, this has the effect of
dropping a sizable number of observations, in particular when
looking at the responses to C3 (7% of the total working age
population). This is mostly due to the frequency of “do not
know” responses. This can be considered additional evidence of
the lack of knowledge and information of individuals, in particular when it comes to retirement accounts. In total, we drop
2,153 observations. In Table A1, we report the demographics
and average financial literacy levels of the general population
with both including and excluding the “do not know responses”. Overall, we do not find much evidence of selectivity
when focusing on the sample without the “do not know”
responses.
We report below the list of financial literacy questions
available in the 2015 NFCS. The Big Three financial literacy
questions refer to M6, M7 and M10.
M6) Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think
you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?
[More than $102; Exactly $102; Less than $102; Don’t know;
Prefer not to say]
M7) Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was
1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how
172
We do not exclude the ‘do not know” and “prefer not to say” answers from
question C1 because question C3, that we use in the definition of workplace-only
investors, is only asked to the respondents answering “yes” to question C1.
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much would you be able to buy with the money in this
account?
[More than today; Exactly the same; Less than today; Don’t
know; Prefer not to say]
M8) If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond
prices?
[They will rise; They will fall; They will stay the same; There is
no relationship between bond prices and the interest rate;
Don’t know; Prefer not to say]
M31) Suppose you owe $1,000 on a loan and the interest rate
you are charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If you
didn’t pay anything off, at this interest rate, how many years
would it take for the amount you owe to double?
[Less than 2 years; At least 2 years but less than 5 years; At
least 5 years but less than 10 years; At least 10 years; Don’t
know; Prefer not to say]
M9) A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly payments than a 30-year mortgage, but the total interest paid over
the life of the loan will be less.
[True; False; Don’t know; Prefer not to say]
M10) Buying a single company’s stock usually provides a safer
return than a stock mutual fund.
[True; False; Don’t know; Prefer not to say]

